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Economists generally agree that in theory, fuel taxes are the most cost effective policies to 
address efficiency losses and combat environmental pollution (see eg. Baumol (1988); 
Dasgupta (1979); Izzo (2007); Mankiw (2006  ); Sitglitz, (2006)). Despite popular agreement 
amongst economists, nonetheless, fuel taxes remain extremely unpopular. The high perceived 
social cost associated with these forms of taxes makes it difficult to implement, as evident 
from the wide variation and low usage, globally, of energy taxes. 
 
What possible reasons could there be for resistance? Taxes have an effect in dynamic systems, 
where their impact is associated with delays, non-linearities and feedbacks. Such systems are 
highly complex and research has shown mass misperceptions of these systems. Few journals 
take into considerations these dynamics when discussing policies for implementing 
sustainable and buoyant fuel taxes in countries. To bridge the gap between theory and practice, 
this research paper makes use of an internet-based survey tool administered on Facebook (an 
online social networking service) to explore for possible reasons for misperceptions, as well 
as test for information policies and general factors that may influence support for fuel taxes. 
 
There has been little empirical analysis in these areas, and no study available that 
simultaneously tests both for the rationale and possible policy options for biases of energy 
taxes.  Compared to earlier experiments where information policies where not tested, 
misperceptions persist in this experiment as well, information policies tend to have very little 
or no impact on decisions of participants. However the survey reveals that some factors 
namely revenue recycling schemes appears to boost more support for taxes than other 
variables. The high tendency to misperceive dynamic systems and their unintended 
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Modern Theory of Economics postulates that under some assumptions public policies should 
be designed to achieve production efficiency, Diamond and Mirrlees ((1971)) . The rule is 
applicable to all traded goods including petroleum products. Economic theory and a number 
of empirical studies (see eg. Gupta et al (2002); Hossain (2003); Pigou (1924);  Baumol & 
Oates (1988) shows that taxation of petroleum may help minimize the loss of efficiency and 
correct market failures in energy markets. In the presence of various externalities and market 
distortions, taxes are generally seen as tools to increase efficiency especially since instruments 
to address these inefficiencies are limited. Subsidies in energy markets, on the other hand, are 
often regarded as inefficient, inequitable tools that frequently lead to a deadweight welfare 
loss where the loss in government revenue is greater than the increase in domestic consumers‘ 
surplus, Gupta et al (2002).  
 
Interestingly, though domestic taxation of petroleum
1
 products have been proven to be 
environmentally effective and economically efficient policy tools, globally, there is a wide 
variation of tax rates on petroleum products across countries, which cannot be explained by 
economic theory alone. In optimal fuel taxes, —in terms of level and use of revenues—leads 
to inefficiencies and lost welfare, this continues to be an issue of daily political concern in 
many countries, and this is the problem we focus on.  
 
The main aim of the research is to gain a better understanding of the misperceptions that 
people generally have of fuel taxes that make them a highly unpopular economic instrument, 
despite being a powerful one.   
 
Above all, the research work‘s focus on misperceptions is of great importance to policy 
makers and to the general public. So far as the beliefs of the public affects government policy,  
if widely held mental models of complex systems are faulty, people may inadvertently favor 
policies that yield outcomes they neither intend nor desire, Sterman & Booth Sweeney (2007). 
Policy makers have to find ways to correct these biases in order to successfully implement 
sustainable efficient policies. 
                                                 
1
 The word 'petroleum' is used throughout the paper to refer to final petroleum products and not to crude oil. The paper 





When countries choose in optimal tax levels, this may result from widespread misperceptions 
of several long-term effects of taxes linked to the misperceptions of dynamic systems. Similar 
works by Moxnes (2007b)(2007a) reveal misperceptions with regards to greenhouse gas taxes 
and emission quotas. His work gives strong incentive for this study. In this work however, we 
progress a step further than other works done on these misconceptions, we test hypothesis for 
these biases and make use of simple information policies to test if this has an impact on 
subject decisions.  
 
Do voters understand the delays and feedbacks effects in the form of the corrective workings 
of the ‗invisible hand‘ in a market system when forming opinions about fuel taxes? Similar to 
other works, Moxnes (2004) (2007b), it is highly unlikely that people comprehend or consider 
these dynamics when making decisions. 
 
Moreover, few journals take into consideration the above stated dynamics when discussing 
policies for implementing sustainable and buoyant fuel taxes in countries. Instead, many 
papers (Hammer et al (2004) link public resistance and sensitivity to fuel taxes to the public‘s 
belief that government would misspend the tax proceeds and it may impose economic 
hardships upon certain individuals, groups and industries. In some articles, resistance has been 
linked to mental cognitive gaps in reasoning Hsu et al (2008).  The reasons stated in these 
articles may very well be the catalyst for opposition; however this work additionally explores 
the possibility that, it is misperceptions of the underlying, dynamics of the system that 
prevents people from objectively appraising the merits of fuel taxes as a corrective measure 
for market failures. At the same time I test for the effect of information and certain economic 
and biographical factors that previous studies have recommended may explain political 
resistance to fuel taxes Hammar et al (2004). There has been little empirical analysis in these 
areas, and no study available that simultaneously considers both of these types of 
explanations.  The most relevant papers in this regard are Moxnes (2007a),(2007b). Moxnes 
(2007a) makes some interesting observations which indicate that people and the media only 
perceive the short term effects of environmental taxes on trucker profits and misperceive the 
long run benefits through the feedback mechanism. They hence misperceive the mechanism 
that Adam Smith called ―the invisible hand‖. These works give a key insight for the problem 
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of focus in the proposed paper as it gives evidence to people‘s disregard for long run benefits 
of taxation. 
Analysis 
To explore for various types of misperceptions we make use of online, web based 
questionnaire (survey) administered on Facebook. The subjects are given the chance to benefit 
from learning. This is ensured by the sequence of the questions and the increasing amount of 
information given out in the questions as they progress along the survey. The questionnaire 
method also ensures less complexity for the subjects than controlled laboratory experiments 
and allows for a larger sample group to be involved in participating in the survey.  
Main findings  
Compared to earlier experiments where information policies were not tested, misperceptions 
persist in this experiment as well, information policies tend to have very little or no impact on 
decisions of participants. However the survey reveals that some factors namely revenue 
recycling schemes appears to boost more support for taxes than other variables.  
Policy and implementation 
In general, political acceptance of gasoline taxes may be enhanced by policy makers targeting 
potential revenue recycling schemes from tax proceeds that are most beneficial to the public 
as well as creating more awareness of the possible benefits of taxes.  
Subsequent chapters 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the appropriate principles 
for setting petroleum taxes efficiently based on reviews of the relevant studies, giving 
evidence to variations between optimally efficient energy tax levels and the actual tax levels 
of petroleum products, globally. Chapter 3 introduces the experiment/ questionnaire design 
and develops the causal loop diagram as well as the hypothesis for misperceptions. Chapter 4 
deals with results of the experiment, while Chapter 5 analyses and discusses the results of the 
survey using statistical packages. Conclusions from the work are drawn in Chapter 6. 
Appendix is included in the end as background information. 
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2. Problem  
2.1 Rationale for energy taxes: Normative Argument 
An important question to consider is; what are the optimal levels of taxes and pricing for 
petroleum products? Economic literature provides a number of considerations and principles 
to consider for taxing petroleum products. These considerations can be classified under three 
(3) main objectives; under these objectives, it is possible to identify seven (7) major reasons 
for taxing petroleum products as presented below: 
1) For efficiency gains   
 To cover production/ transport and refinery costs  
 To charge for benefits and costs associated with its consumption 
 To raise revenue for government 
 To improve energy efficiency 
2) Equity considerations  
 To improve distribution of income 
3) Price stabilization and energy security 
 To conserve foreign exchange and reduce over dependence on oil 
 To maintain price stability of petroleum products 
 
(i) To cover production/ transport and refinery costs  
The theory of economics suggests that input prices for energy products should be set equal to 
the efficient level of prices. Ideally, assuming there are no barriers to trade internationally, 
Hossain (2003) shows that the efficient price for a fully traded good would be the 
international or border price (import or export parity price)
2
 , suitably adjusted for quality 
differences and full cost recovery of producers/importers, refiners and distributers including 
the cost of maintenance of facilities and assets. This rule is generally applicable to all 
internationally traded goods.  This basic rule however requires adjustments in the presence of 





                                                 
2
 Import parity price is applicable in countries that are net importers of oil, and export parity price are applicable 
in net exporters of countries. 
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(ii) To charge for benefits and costs associated with its consumption 
Road use: 
By far the rationale for charging petroleum products in order to maintain and finance road 
infrastructure has been the most applied. Fuel taxes are often used as instruments for 
generating revenues in the transport sector for road infrastructure financing, GTZ 
International Fuel Prices (2008). This rationale gains more grounding since the level of 
driving of people is strongly correlated to the amount of fuel consumed, GTZ, International 
Fuel Prices (2009). Therefore, taxing fuel consumption directly charges consumers for road 
use, thus implementing the ‗users pay‘ principle which states that road users should pay for 
using road infrastructure. It serves as a cost to consumers for the use of social public goods. It 
is therefore comparable to other costs levied by the government for the provision of public 
goods such as health care and education.  Other options such as road tolls are more costly to 
implement and may increase traffic jams.  
 
Ideally, the tax should be able to cover the use of road infrastructure and maintenance of such 
infrastructure. In many OECD countries a portion or all of fuel taxes is earmarked towards 
highway maintenance and construction, very few developing countries however earmark 
petroleum revenues for this purpose. The 10 US cents duty advocated by SSATP (Sub-
Saharan African Policy Programme), Meeting of African Transport Ministers of November 
2005 held in Bamako/Mali for developing countries and the World Bank is regarded as the 
benchmark for road financing, and has been cited by a number of works on fuel taxation (see 
GTZ International Fuel Prices (2008) (2009)),   this supposedly will not lead to major 
economic distortions.  In addition to the 10 US cents, the World Bank further recommends a 
vehicle tax of USD 75 per Annum for small passenger vehicles and USD 500 for medium-
sized trucks, GTZ International Fuel Prices (2009). In the USA, fuel taxes of about US 10 
cents per liter of diesel and gasoline are levied to cover all direct expenditure for roads and 
highways (maintenance, refurbishment, new construction and capital recovery for the road 
and highways department). For the United Kingdom, research Newbery (2005a.) estimates 
that the road-user component is about half of the current fuel tax; pollution and other 
externalities bring the optimal tax up to about 70% of the UK fuel tax, or more than $2 per 
gallon, Parry et al (2006). In Ghana, the road fund levy accounts for 7% of the total ex pump 
price which in 2008 was 90 US cents/liter.  
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 The above recommendations on road duties appear reasonable, however to gain support, it 
has to be customized to the countries of implementation.  The lower traffic density in many 
developing countries means that revenues received from road users will be lower than that of 
industrialized nations. Hence the adoption of the US 10 cents per liter levy will only cover 
periodic road maintenance expenditures and not new construction of roads. The levy however 
may include maintenance of the more inaccessible rural roads, for which portions of the total 
levy sum (US 2 cents per liter) suggested by GTZ, International Fuel Prices (2009) may form 
the basis for solving this problem in many countries. 
 
Congestion 
Energy taxes can act as a proxy for other social costs (like accidents, congestion etc.) incurred 
by road transport users. Apart from the externalities associated with fuel consumption it has 
been argued that internalization of external costs such as delays and traffic accidents to other 
users and third parties serves as a good rationale for additional taxation of petroleum and 
vehicle use. These costs, such as vehicle accidents, are frequently ignored in petroleum taxing, 
but nonetheless impose social costs on the society well above the private costs that the users 
themselves bear, Hossain (2003). 
 
In charging taxes with this respect, Gupta et al (1995) suggested that policy makers be 
selective and target the more congested roads. High license charges or surcharges, as is the 
case in Singapore, for specific locations may be highly effective. Other alternatives are 
electronic road pricing, parking charges and specific road tolls. 
 
Environment 
Fuel taxes are seen as indispensable to the transition of the transport sector to low carbon, 
energy efficient sector, GTZ International Fuel Prices (2008). Increasingly, policy makers 
and analysts are turning to energy taxes as economic instruments, as they are environmentally 
effective and economically efficient policy instruments. Preserving the environment is very 
important for both governments and society at large. Energy taxes serve as useful instruments 
to reduce environmentally harmful behavior by encouraging more efficient energy use and 
stimulating the development of zero-emission technologies by increasing fossil fuel prices. 
Though energy production imposes health and amenity costs on society they are hardly 
considered in private economic decisions, hence analysts and policy makers are increasingly 
turning to energy taxes to address the problem of global climate change. This trend is likely to 
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gain momentum as developed countries assess their ability to meet their commitments under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) with introductions of 
strict environmental regulations. 
 
The difficulty here is that attempting to tax pollution damage directly is often administratively 
costly and is a subject of debate and disagreements. This is because, though there appears a 
strong correlation between motor vehicle operation and the amount of pollution emitted, there 
does not seem to be a direct relationship between the combustion of petroleum and carbon 
dioxide emissions. Motor vehicles generally vary with their rate of pollution; by far research 
(see Nivola and Crandall (1995. ); USEPA (2005. ); UNEP ) shows that the greatest 
determinant of most motor vehicle pollutants is the number of vehicle miles travelled and 
vehicle weight.  Another point to consider is that if there is to be a nationwide tax on 
petroleum, based on environmental considerations in cities and townships, the rural areas may 
be unfairly penalized as urban areas generally have higher concentrations of environmental 
pollutants than rural areas. In the case of global warming a broader environmental tax may be 
justified however very difficult to implement across borders.  
 
Alternatively, another policy tool that can be used to address environmental pollution from 
energy related products is the use of caps or direct regulation.  Direct regulatory activities 
such as for example setting caps and legal limits on the emission level of certain gases, forces 
immediate compliance of energy industries not taking into consideration the time delays and 
comparative costs for different businesses and individuals. On the other hand, using 
environmental taxes offers more flexibility to adapt for those affected as compared to direct 
regulation. Additionally, taxes are policy tools that can be easily implanted through existing 
administrative systems Muller (1996). Energy taxes are seen as more flexible because 
companies affected can take time to make the necessary changes so that in the future they will 
not have to pay the tax. The tax, therefore, allows those who have cheaper means of reducing 
emissions, to do so first, whilst allowing those with higher pollution control costs, to pay the 
tax and have enough time to make technological adjustments for the future. The economy 
meets its environmental objective more cheaply than by direct regulation. Moreover, research 
Zhang (2004) shows that carbon taxes can act as a strong incentive to search for cleaner 
technologies whilst for direct regulations there is no incentive for the polluters to go beyond 
the standards. 
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How high should these taxes be? To a large extent it will depend on how large the 
externalities are; As long as monitoring and administrative costs are low, a pollution tax 
equivalent to the marginal social cost of pollution yields a welfare maximizing equilibrium 
Tietenberg (1992). A recent review, Parry (2001) has estimated that the total environmental 
and congestion cost of gasoline consumption in the UK is between US$0.25 and US$0.40 per 
liter, an amount that would imply 100 percent of the free market price Hossain (2003). In 
developing countries however, it is recommended that externality costs be set lower as 
incomes and environmental pollution levels are lower than the developed world. 
 
Another factor to consider in taxing fuel for environmental purposes is to differentiate fuel tax 
rates by fuel quality. For example research GTZ, International Fuel Prices (2007) has shown 
that  higher tax rates on ‗dirty and more damaging fuels‘ (i.e. leaded fuel or fuels with high 
sulphur content) have helped reduce or phase out their usage in European countries. 
 
iii) To improve the distribution of income 
Petroleum taxes can have a significant impact on the distribution of income in developing 
countries, where petroleum products are used frequently for lighting, heating and cooking and 
transport purposes. It constitutes a large proportion of the consumption basket of the poor. In 
this case, unless the use of petroleum (especially diesel and kerosene) by the poor, for these 
purposes is considered, petroleum taxes can be regressive. Detailed empirical studies indicate 
that taxation of kerosene can indeed be regressive, as was found in Indonesia, Thailand and 
Tunisia between the mid-1970s and early 1980s Gupta et al (1995).  On the other hand the 
consumption of motor gasoline has been found by many studies (see Gupta et al (1995), Parry 
et al, (2006)) to rise rapidly with rising incomes in developing countries; hence in this context 
the tax on gasoline would be considered more progressive.  
 
 In most countries the question of the appropriate tax rates between gasoline and diesel is 
highly complex. In many developing countries gasoline and kerosene is mainly used for 
individual consumption purposes whereas diesel fuel is used as an intermediate good for 
transport of goods and services, and for agricultural and manufacturing production. A high 
level of taxation on an intermediate good may impede international competitiveness. Diesel is 
highly used in the railways, in industries as well as for electricity generation. Perhaps, if 
diesel fuel for non-road purposes can be differently taxed as in the UK, Germany and other 
industrialized countries this would reduce the problem of competitiveness considerably. 
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However in many developing countries it is difficult to separate road use of diesel and 
gasoline from its other uses. 
 
Many countries are averse to the idea of adjusting petroleum prices upwards in response to 
current rises in world oil prices because of the fear that rising oil prices may have inflationary 
effects which would adversely affect the poor. In the short run these concerns may have 
strong support, however, policy makers have to be mindful to compare the direct inflationary 
consequences of this price rises, to the inflationary consequences of a larger budget deficit 
that is likely to result as petroleum product prices are subsidized, Gupta et al (1995). If public 
support of fuel taxes is to be secured, policy makers have to find means to design the tax in 
such a way as to alleviate the short run regressive impacts on the poor. In Ghana, for instance 
in 2006, a number of mitigating measures to protect the poor were adopted such as investment 
in the provision of mass urban transport, extra funds were also made available to expand a 
rural electrification scheme. 
 
iv) To improve energy efficiency 
Fuel taxes play an important role in acting as a great incentive to achieve efficiency in the 
transport sector. Higher fuel prices acts as a financial incentive to reduce consumption of fuel 
and increase adoption of conservation methods. High fuel prices promote fuel efficiency 
either by stimulating the purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles as well as their appropriate 
maintenance or by encouraging economical driving behavior (eco-driving) GTZ, International 
Fuel Prices (2009). Excessive vehicle purchase and use, a problem in many urban areas 
becomes more expensive, making walking; cycling, ‗car pools‘ and public transport more 
attractive, GTZ, International Fuel Prices (2009). It is also a motivation factor for the 
construction and design of more energy efficient transport networks in the medium to long –
term. Higher fuel prices can be an important driving force to a low-carbon and energy 
efficient transport sector. 
 
It has been observed that in the long run higher fuel taxes encourage the development of 
dense settlements, often in combination with mixed use areas that makes trips shorter. 
Experiences from countries with high fuel prices reveal that users and providers of transport 
services and infrastructure often smartly adapt habits and policies, GTZ, International Fuel 
Prices (2009). These trends should encourage countries with low taxation levels to gradually 
increase taxes on fossil fuels to promote more energy efficient mobility solutions  
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Recent studies  Litman (2009) have shown that consumers and businesses are not only 
affected by the fuel prices (cost per gallon or liter) but by the total fuel costs, i.e. the product 
of fuel prices times vehicle fuel economy (miles per gallon or kilometers per liter) times 
vehicle mileage (motor vehicle miles or kilometers driven), as summarized below: 
 
Annual Fuel Cost = Fuel Price x Fuel Economy x Annual Mileage (Adapted from Litman 
(2009)) 
 
This formula is a sensible, true economic approach to analyzing fuel costs , as it makes 
consumers not only focus on the problem of fuel pricing but also on improving fuel economy 
and reducing per capita vehicle travel. It can be described as true economy because it 
increases overall efficiency and helps provide maximum benefits whereas other policies such 
as subsidies may just shift cost burdens to other goods and exacerbate the problem. 
 
People often believe that fuel demand is inelastic but there is strong research to show 
otherwise, (see T. Sterner (2006), Litman (2009), Litman (2010)) refer to table 1 below. The 
price elasticity is quite high but only in the long- run, in the short run it tends to be quite 
inelastic, (see Table 1 below). A fuel tax would have a stronger impact on fuel consumption 
in the long-run having important implications for policy makers. 
 
Table 1 Summary of price elasticity’s of gasoline consumption 
Source Short Run Long Run 
‗Appropriate response 
to rising prices‘ VTPI  
(2009) 
-- -0.05 for a 0.10 fuel 
price increase. 
Range -0.04 - -0.06 
Goodwin, Dargay and 
Hanly, 2003 
-0.25 
Range -0.01, -0.57 
Number of estimates: 46  
-0.64 
Range 0, -1.81 
Number of estimates: 51 
Graham and Glaister 
(2002)  
-0.27  
Range-0.2 to -0.3 
-0.71  
Range -0.6 to -0.8 
Average  elasticity  (by 
author) (use of 
Goodwin et al (2003) 
and Graham et al(2002) 





Figure 1: Fuel Price versus fuel consumption (Source: OECD 2005) 
 
Figure 1 compares fuel prices and per capita transportation energy consumption in various 
countries. High fuel prices appear to be associated with low energy consumption. The U.S., 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand have low fuel prices and high transportation energy 
consumption, while people in other developed countries pay two or three times as much for 
fuel and consume about half as much transport energy. 
 
Some articles have asserted that had Europe not followed a policy of high fuel taxation but 
had low taxes, then fuel demand would have been twice as large. The experience of fuel taxes 
in Europe, Japan and a few other countries may in fact provide some evidence to these 
assertions, Sterner (2006). The statement by the CEO of Daimler Chrysler, Tom La Sorda at 
the U.S. House Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality (2007), in this respect, further 
support this affirmation.  He called for the U.S. to adopt policies that rely more on market 
forces to drive consumer demand in order to improve the fuel economy of the U.S. vehicle 
fleet and fight climate change GTZ, International Fuel Prices (2008). Research GTZ, 
International Fuel Prices (2008), shows that the European vehicle fleet has 50% better fuel 
economy than U.S. fleet. The statement by the CEO of Daimler Chrysler emphasizes the 
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importance of fuel tax policies, he said "They've highly taxed gasoline, making the price three 
times higher than in the U.S., and they have incentives on diesel fuel. As a result of these 
policies, fuel economy is always high on a customer's list and not just when there's a spike in 
fuel prices". Studies in OECD countries have also shown that energy taxes do increase energy 
efficiency in the long run see Figure 2 below.  
Figure 2: Source:  GTZ, International Fuel Prices (2008) Effect of fuel taxes on fuel economy in 
kilometers per liter 
 
As can be seen from figure 2. , the implementation of fuel taxes over the years has contributed 
to a reduction of usage of gasoline for vehicles; this implies an increase in fuel economy in 
industrialized nations. The conclusions drawn from this trend is that, fuel costs per vehicle-
mile, declined during most of the last four decades because manufacturers responded to high 
fuel prices in the 1970s and 80s by developing more efficient vehicles. 
 
v) Important contribution to general budget revenues 
Many governments see fuel taxes as a means of generating revenues for the public budget. 
They can be seen as a reliable source of revenue for the state because they can be collected 
relatively easily even with just a few refineries or fuel distribution centers. An energy tax is 
potentially an excellent way to reduce the budget deficit. According to an article in the 
Economist (1993), it offers not just revenue but a cleaner environment too, and with relatively 
little effect on economic growth or competitiveness. Additionally, fuel taxes are 
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administratively less costly than say income taxes or value added taxes (VAT) which in many 
developing countries are hard to enforce and thus often constitute a weak and unreliable basis 
for public revenue.  
 
As stated above, the taxation of the domestic consumption of petroleum products is an 
important source of revenue in many countries. In developing countries it generally accounted 
for about 7% to 30% of total revenue in the early and mid 1990‘s and was equal to between 1 
and 3.5% of GDP, Gupta and Mahler (1995). Even in some industrial countries, petroleum 
revenue has amounted to up to 2% of GDP. Some studies have even gone so far as to claim 
that it usually provides far more revenue than any other product, including tobacco or 
alcoholic beverages Gupta and Mahler (1995). This claim may be highly possible, as fuel 
products are universally consumed unlike tobacco and alcohol which are more specific to 
consumer tastes and cultural regulations.  
 
In addition, given that energy demand is price inelastic and that there are negative 
consumption externalities associated with its use, taxation of petroleum products is generally 
regarded as an efficient and easier way to raise government revenue. A conventional guide to 
raising revenue has been the Ramsey tax rule, which  suggests that commodities that are 
relatively insensitive to price changes  (low price elasticity of demand) should be taxed more 
than a commodity that are susceptible to price changes (high elasticity of demand). However 
this rule has been subject to criticism as it directs taxation towards ‗necessities‘ Hossain 
(2003). It is proposed that where income distribution and equity concerns are important the 
tax has to be adapted to the situation. 
 
The possible advantages of fuel taxes as a revenue raiser are immense.  Revenues from these 
taxes form major contribution towards financing core state functions, such as the health 
services, education and security. Recent World Bank analysis shows that taxes on petroleum 
products are a critical source of government revenue for low-income countries. . In Ghana, for 
instance, tax revenue from fuel products accounted for nearly 4 percent of GDP in 2004.   
 
Taxation of petroleum may help minimize the efficiency losses of taxes in general, if the 
revenue collected is recycled to reduce taxes on other products that are more distortionary 
‗double dividend‘. This claim though weak, provides a possible mitigation measure for the 
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regressive impact of these forms of taxes on poorer households.  It is important however, to 
caution that excessive reliance on petroleum taxes however, may distort resource allocation. 
 
 
There is general agreement amongst Economists, that taxation of petroleum products for 
revenue reasons should be based on same general tax principles
3
 as in the case of other goods.  
As fuels are regarded as any other commercial good, they should always be subjected to a 
sales tax (example Value Added Tax). VAT should ideally be charged on the full sales value 
of fuels (including the fuel tax element) GTZ, International Fuel Prices (2009). Generally, 
imposition of a VAT (or general sales tax) is preferable to arbitrary taxes on individual 
commodities.  VAT has been described as a nondiscriminatory and neutral tax that avoids 
distortion
4
 associated with taxation of inputs to production, Hossain, (1995)(2000).  
 
It is important to note that petroleum taxes may be less effective in countries that border other 
nations that have subsidized petroleum products, as this allows for smuggling from these 
neighboring countries. In such a situation, setting a tax on petroleum products will yield very 
little revenue to the government. A possible line of action, that a government can take to 
salvage this situation, is to enforce laws to outlaw smuggling. 
 
vi) To conserve foreign exchange and reduce dependence on oil (energy security). 
Over the past 35 years, oil prices have fluctuated widely. The ‗limits to growth‘ study 
emphasizes the finite nature of our global energy resources Meadow (1972). Hubbert (1950) 
‗peak oil‘ theory explains  that,  oil and gas production must follow a ‗life cycle; a period of 
exponential production and low prices followed  by a long period of rising costs and reduced 
production as resources are depleted.  In recent years the rise in energy demands, depletion of 
oil and gas resources and long delays in the implementation of alternative energy sources 
raises the potential for increases in petroleum price.  
 
In periods when energy prices have been low, the market continues to expect that prices will 
remain low over time; this becomes a major barrier to the improvement of energy efficiency 
                                                 
3
 It has been shown that, it is more efficient to tax all commodities at the same rate (e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz 
1976). 
4
 When goods are excluded from consumption taxes, some distortion of relative prices is likely to occur, 
particularly to the degree that goods are complements to or substitutes for the excluded goods. It has been shown 
that , 
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and the development of alternative technologies and infrastructure. In many cases, even 
relatively modest taxes can help reduce the ‗cheap fuel’ psychology, Muller (1996), in effect, 
energy taxes serves as a means to prepare consumers for a future rise in energy price trends 
(transition effect). 
 
In addition to the transition effect, many countries that are net importers of petroleum 
products may resort to petroleum taxation as a means to lessen consumption and strengthen or 
maintain the value of its domestic currency. This policy may be more effective if other non 
petroleum product imports are targeted as well. 
 
Some countries seek to achieve energy security by raising the costs of petroleum products in 
relation to other domestic alternatives. This may be done by charging a premium on 
petroleum products (excise duty).  This strategy allows consumers to be less dependent on oil 
imports and turn to domestic alternative technologies, over time, which are less price volatile. 
It also allows for more energy conservation.  
 
Furthermore using a carbon/energy tax to provide a steady price signal over time, has the 
added advantage of moving people away from carbon-intensive energy choices. Such a price-
driven shift will not be possible in the short run but can only occur in the medium to long-
term, due to the rate of capital stock turnover and existing infrastructures. This explains why 
in most cases, carbon/energy taxes are used as one instrument in a much broader package of 
policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
vii) Price Stabilization 
Fuel prices have increased significantly in recent years. Between 2003 and 2008 alone, 
average U.S. gasoline retail prices more than doubled, from $1.77 to $4.10 per gallon, and 
high prices are expected to continue due to growing international demand and rising 
production costs Jackson (2007).  
 
In the face of such unstable international price volatility, a case can be made for using taxes as 
instruments to stabilize domestic prices of petroleum products. Most producers and 
consumers appear to be risk averse and hence this frequent price changes may impose costs 
on them. If there are insurance markets and economic agents have access to facilities that 
hedge risk, then there may not be a crucial need for intervention in the market to attain price 
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stability, however in many developing economies these risk protection facilities are not 
available. In such situations, a case can be made for ‗cushioning‘ the domestic prices from 
price fluctuations by using variable taxes. The benefits of this price stabilization measure must 
however be significant in order to justify such taxes.  
 
Based on the discussion so far, it is possible to place the seven (7) components that should be 
considered whilst setting prices of petroleum products into equation (1).  
 






P* = International (border prices), 
t1 To charge for benefits and costs associated with its consumption 
t2  Tax set to improve distribution of income 
t3  Tax set to  raise  revenue for government 
t4   Tax set to conserve foreign exchange and reduce over dependence on oil 
t5 Tax set to maintain price stability of petroleum products 
t6  Tax set to improve energy efficiency 
 
 
2.2 Variations from the optimal (Descriptive)  
Though petroleum taxation serves as an important instrument to policy makers and the 
economy as a whole, there is an extremely wide variation from the optimal considerations 
discussed in Chapter 2.1, which cannot be explained by economic rational theory alone. 
Studies have shown that no other product is subject to such divergent treatment, Gupta and 
Mahler (1995). These variations are visible in the retail prices and tax rates on the various 
petroleum products and across countries. Appendix H. shows the prices of gasoline and diesel 
in 174 countries around the world in November 2008 (adopted from a survey carried out in 
mid November 2008 by GTZ International Fuel Prices (2008) for 174 countries). This survey 
reveals that 20 out of the 174 countries used in the survey have some form of gasoline 
subsidies of which ten (10) have set the retail prices of gasoline below the price of crude oil 
on the world market. It indicates several striking patterns. First, the prices of gasoline and 
diesel varied widely across the countries. For instance, in Africa gasoline prices per liter in 
2008 varied from as low as 14 cents in Libya and 34 cents in Algeria to on the high side about 
120 cents in Kenya and 253 cents in Eritrea. Similarly, in OECD countries the gasoline price 
per liter varied between 78 cents in the US and 165 cents in the UK. Second the level of 
gasoline and diesel prices is generally very low in oil exporting countries and higher in net oil 
                                                 
5
 Equation adapted from Hossain (2003) and modified by author.  
 22 
importing countries. Third, it is noticeable that the prices of gasoline are generally higher than 
the prices of diesel fuel. Another interesting observation that has also been made in a recent 
study Coady et al (2007 ) that is however not visible in the survey, is that variations in fuel 
prices also occur across time, fuel prices tend to be lower in times when world  crude oil 
prices are higher, reflecting slow responses of governments to rises in oil prices. At the time 
of the survey, November 2008, crude oil prices where on the low (US$48 per barrel). These 
patterns and wide variations in prices of products are highly dependent on wide variations in 
the levels of the taxes and subsidies on petroleum products imposed for different reasons 







Figure 3: Comparison of actual and optimal level of fuel taxation earmarked for road 
maintenance in 20 African countries (source GTZ, International Fuel Prices (2009)). 
 
Figure 3 above shows variations from the optimal road maintenance tax level of 10 US cents 
across countries in Africa. The survey shows that out of 20 countries in the sample only seven 
(7) implemented the 10 US cents levy for road maintenance. On average, the level of fuel 
taxation earmarked for road maintenance in the sample countries averaged approximately 7.5 
US cents/Liter.  For Petrol, Namibia recorded the highest value of approximately 15 US 
cents/liter whereas Cote d‘Ivoire recorded the lowest of approximately 2.9 US cents/liter.  
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Subsidies:  Evidence of variations from optimal taxing of petroleum 
products 
 
Energy taxes and subsidies are economic tools that are used as corrective measures of private 
market distortions. Generally, large subsidies redirect public expenditures away from more 
productive spending or contribute to unsustainable budget deficits. Low fuel prices fail to 
provide the appropriate incentives to households to be more efficient in their use of energy, 
which could mitigate the overall adverse effect of higher world prices on the economy. 
 
Generally, there is popular support
6
 for policies that minimize fuel prices through subsidies 
and tax reductions, but such policies harm consumers and the economy overall because they 
increase total fuel consumption and vehicle travel, and therefore associated costs such as 
traffic and parking congestion, infrastructure costs, traffic crashes, trade imbalances and 
pollution emissions. Economic theory and several studies have shown that fuel price 
reductions are an inefficient way to help low-income households (see GTZ, International Fuel 
Prices (2009), Gupta et al (2002), Coady et al (2006) (2007 ) Litman  (2009) ; other strategies 
are more efficient and provide long term benefits. Because many transport decisions are 
durable, it has been observed that low fuel price policies are particularly harmful over the 
long term, Litman (2009). 
 
Additionally, petroleum product price subsidies can impose significant fiscal and social costs 
that are highly misperceived. When oil exporting countries do not adjust domestic prices of 
fuel product prices to reflect world prices, they forgo all the revenues that they could have 
received had they put in place taxes. Subsidies also increase domestic consumption, however 
from a revenue raising point of view, every barrel of oil consumed locally could have been 
exported for higher revenues internationally, indicating a cost. This can be described as an 
implicit subsidy. The initial cost of implicit subsidies is typically assumed by the National oil 
company without any explicit compensation through the budget. The size of these subsidies 
                                                 
6
 Bangladesh: Implicit subsidy for diesel and kerosene is estimated at US $1.2 billion 
� Cambodia: Annual energy price subsidies of about USD 120 million 
� China: State price regulation leads to bottlenecks in supplies, since the fuel producing and 
distributing businesses do not bear the losses that can be expected 
� Indonesia now expects to spend nearly $14 billion on fuel subsidies in 2008 (situation before 
current fuel price hike), more than double last year's $6 billion bill, 
� Iran: Rationing of fuel and the sale of additional quantities at higher prices 
� Jordan: Fuel subsidies in 2007 totalled about USD 350 million 
� Burma: Price rises led to unrest at the beginning of 2007 
 24 
cannot be measured however it is predicted to be large Coady et al (2007). They include costs 
borne by public entities such as oil producing companies that are not typically reported in the 
budget; tax expenditures, such as tax exemptions for oil products; and the difference between 
retail prices and import parity prices. Estimates (source IMF staff estimates in Coady et al 
(2007)) were available for six countries for 2006 and range from 0.3 percent (the Dominican 
Republic) to 10.4 percent of GDP (Azerbaijan), and average 3.9 percent of GDP (higher than 
the 3 percent observed in 2005) (refer to table 2 below).
 
On the other hand when oil- 
importing countries do not adjust petroleum product prices, there is usually a direct fiscal cost. 
Implicit subsidies are much harder to measure and often are not reported.  
 
Petroleum subsidies tend to be inefficient mainly because they are not targeted accurately. 
Studies have shown that those who mainly benefit from subsidies in the long run are the rich 
GTZ, International Fuel Prices (2009), Coady et al (2007). The reasoning here is that the 
higher the household income, the higher the subsidy; because higher income households 
consume more petroleum products, they benefit more from the subsidy. A study by the World 
Bank (2006 ) estimated that in Venezuela in the early 1990s, the richest 20 % of the 
population received six times more in fuel subsidy than the poorest third of the population. By 
distorting price signals fuel subsidies may lead to wasteful and misallocation of scarce 
resources.  
 
Subsidies may also encourage rent seeking and smuggling. Especially in situations where 
countries subsidizing fuel, neighbor highly taxed countries. Citizens may travel to 
neighboring countries that subsidize fuel in order to access cheaper fuel. Several countries 
have responded to the increase in world oil prices by increasing explicit and implicit price 
subsidies on domestic fuels. Explicit subsidies mainly reflect compensation to the national 
energy company for the increased difference between the wholesale domestic price and the 
world price of fuels Coady et al (2007). Estimates of such subsidies (at different levels of 
government) were available (refer to Table 2. source IMF staff estimates in Coady et al 
(2007)) in sixteen cases, and they range from 0.1 percent (Lebanon) to 8.5 percent (Yemen) of 






Table 2: Fuel Subsidies (Source IMF staff estimates in Coady et al (2007) 
 
 
A more recent survey by GTZ, International Fuel Prices (2008) shows the calculated transport 
fuel taxation as a percentage of total tax revenues (see figure 4. below). Not surprisingly 
negative taxation (or petroleum subsidies) tended to be higher in net oil exporting countries, 
example Venezuela with 8% subsidies and Azerbaijan with 5% subsidies. Countries in the 
OECD on the other hand tended to have high petroleum tax rates, for example, Norway, with 
8% of fuel taxation as percentage of total tax revenues and the UK with 12% of fuel taxation 








2.3 Prior findings of Misperceptions of Dynamic Systems   
 
Economists generally agree that in theory, fuel taxes are the most cost effective policies to 
address efficiency losses and combat environmental pollution (see eg., Baumol and Oates, 
1988; Dasgupta and Heal 1979; Izzo, 2007; Mankiw, 2006; Sitglitz, 2006). As discussed in 
previous chapters, despite popular agreement amongst economists, nonetheless, fuel taxes 
remain extremely unpopular.  
 
This is unfortunate from an economic perspective as fuel taxes are policy tools that can be 
easily implanted through existing administrative systems Muller (1996), and have been 
described as a reasonable pigouvian tax, scaling proportionately with the harms of 
consumption, Hsu et al (2008).  
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Even though to a large extent fuel tax increases are unpopular now this may change in the 
future;  Parry et al (2006) suggest that pressure for higher fuel (or other automobile) taxes 
from those concerned about global warming, energy dependence, under-funded highways, and 
widening federal deficits, is only likely to intensify. Hence it is important to find possible 
reasons for resistance and target policies to address them. 
 
Several articles have researched into people‘s misunderstandings of dynamic systems, (see eg. 
Sterman and Booth Sweeney (2002); Moxnes (2003)). These articles give some insights into 
possible hypothesis that tax systems, being complex and dynamic are frequently misperceived. 
Generally, in democracies the beliefs of the public affect government policy, still, choices 
may be constrained by limited information and misperceptions among voters and politicians. 
If widely held mental models of complex systems are faulty, people may inadvertently favor 
policies that yield outcomes they neither intend nor desire Sterman and Booth Sweeney 
(2007). Fuel taxes can be described as one of such issues. Research, Opinion and newspaper 
surveys show that people have highly emotional and contradictory attitudes towards energy 
taxes in general Moxnes (2007). The fuel tax idea seems to have remained politically 
unpopular Hsu et al (2008). Gasoline taxes, in particular, are a form of pollution tax that have 
been politically dangerous to propose Nivola and Crandall (1995), despite even stronger 
support from economists Mankiw (2006  ). 
 
Fuel prices are often described as a highly sensitive political issue
7
. Many countries face rigid 
resistance from its citizenry concerning in particular fuel taxes, even at lower prices many 
consumers feel they pay more than is fair. There are frequent demands for investigations and 
demands for cheaper fuel, Litman (2009). 
 
The widespread resistance to these taxes makes it difficult for governments to implement fuel 
taxes effectively. In many democratic governments, policies are shaped by economic interests 
and hence, in countries in which the electorate populations are highly dependent on fuel 
                                                 
7
 Political unrest in many countries 
– Mozambique: Riots after fuel price increases, Gov was forced to reduce fuel levy for PT 
operators 
– Cameroon: Riots after fuel price increases 
– Burkina Faso: Riots after increases in fuel and food prices 
– In Asian countries (Burma, Indonesia) fuel price increases triggered political unrest in the 
past – Indonesia in facing new unrest 
– Protests are often linked to general political instability/unrest; increases in fuel prices are 
rather a trigger of than actual reason of conflicts. 
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consumption, the more difficult it is politically to raise fuel taxes,  Sterner (2007) see also 
Hammer et al. (2004).  
 
Sterman (1992)  demonstrates that decision making in complex dynamic environments is poor 
relative to normative standards, or even simple decision rules, especially when decisions have 
indirect, delayed, nonlinear, and multiple feedback effects. Sterman (1989a), (1989b) also 
argues that the mental models people use to guide their decisions in dynamic settings are 
flawed in specific ways: that they tend to ignore feedback processes which cause side-effects 
and also that such "misperceptions of feedback‖ generate systematically dysfunctional 
behavior in dynamically complex settings. 
 
Other efforts in studying misperceptions of simple dynamics have been made by Booth 
Sweeney & Sterman (2000), Kainz and Ossimitz (2002), and Moxnes(2003). Moxnes (2003) 
demonstrate that people misperceive even basic simple systems.  
As stated earlier, fuel taxes impact dynamic systems which are constantly misperceived. In 
the short run fuel taxes have very little desirable effect on households but a big resistance that 
makes politicians hesitate; the important balancing and beneficial effects come in the long run 
but that is a limited consolation to politicians trying to get reelected and therefore looking for 
visible progress in the short run T. Sternar (2007). The main challenge for the subjects in the 
experiment is to take in to account the long delays of the ‗invisible hand‘ and in energy taxes 
increasing energy efficiency in the long term and hence reducing dependence and 
vulnerability to oil price shocks . Retrofits are delayed by time needed to perceive benefits, to 
plan, finance, and reconstruct Moxnes (2007).  
On the other hand, if price minimization policies are applied they may impose costs elsewhere in 
the Economy, and increase total fuel consumption and vehicle travel which exacerbates other 
economic, social and environmental problems. In addition, as many transport decisions are 
highly durable (cars, road infrastructure) and have associated relatively large capital costs, low fuel 
taxing policies are particularly hazardous in the long term.  Similar to Climate change policy issues 
Sterman and Booth Sweeney (2002), targeted policies must take into account delays and dynamics 
of a system. If fuel tax policies are introduced at later stages, the adjustments to these changes will be 
a lot more costly due to lost opportunity costs for more efficient and cheaper alternative sources of 
energy. Additionally, if conflicting policies such as subsidies are put in place in order to 
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mitigate the effects of a fuel tax on the people, it may redirect public expenditures away from 
more productive spending or contribute to unsustainable budget deficits Coady et al (2006) .  
Policies that attempt to reduce fuel prices through subsidies and tax reductions usually only 
provide modest consumer savings (a few cents per gallon or liter). This is because larger 
reductions are so costly. In addition, producers may capture a portion of the savings through 
higher profit margins rather than passing savings on as price reductions. 
 
Few Journal articles deal with the dynamics of the system when addressing energy tax 
policies. The most relevant papers include Moxnes (2007) in his report on Green tax, trucker 
actions, media coverage, misperception and political reversal. To the extent that people are 
still aware of delays, they usually underestimate their length, Sterman (2000). Even when they 
have full information about delay times, this information may not influence decisions, 
Brehmer (1989), Sterman (1989a), and Diehl and Sterman (1995) and Sterman (1995). The 
likely reason for deviations from optimal is that people tend to operate with mental models 
that do not take account of delays. These misperceptions of delays are related to 
misperceptions of dynamic systems in general (Sterman (1989a), Funke (1991), Moxnes 
(1998), Sweeney and Sterman (2000)). Evidence showing that misperceptions persist in 
dynamic systems ultimately contests economics rational actor models which are insufficient 
to improve the understanding of the internal mechanism of the system.  
 
In addition to the above referred researches on misperceptions of dynamic systems, other tax 
literature have given empirical evidence to the sources of ‗fiscal illusion‘,8  Smolders (1993) and 
misperceptions of tax burdens. Ashworth (1997) also investigates politician local tax preferences 
as a function of political costs (expected loss in votes). Other investigations also indicate that 
people misperceive certain aspects of tax systems. For instance, people do not differ clearly 
between marginal and average tax rates, De Bartolome (1995). Eriksen (1996) found that 
people‘s attitudes towards taxation were influenced by their knowledge about the tax system.  
 
 
                                                 
8 The notion of fiscal illusion is associated with the misperception of the fiscal burden that is the amount of taxes 
paid.  There is also a negative version of fiscal illusion, which means that taxpayers perceive their tax burden to 
be heavier than it actually is. energy taxes serve as typical example of a negative version of fiscal illusion (Kalle 
Määttä - 2006 - Business & Economics - 114 pages) 
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All these studies contribute significantly to our knowledge about how people misperceive the 
underpinnings of dynamic systems and provide a strong motivation for our study. The main 
contribution of this paper is to test for possible misperceptions that the public may have 
construed of fuel taxes and explore some possible information policies that may mitigate this 
misperceptions. A useful method to implement successful policies is to first and foremost 
reveal biases (the objective of this experimental paper) and then explore for some 
determinants of these biases.  If we are successful in revealing such misconceptions and find 
some influential determinants, that should motivate further research to further test these 
determinants. This phenomenon of misperceptions is of great importance to policy makers, 
theorists and the public in general. For the former group, an understanding of the gap between 
perceived system structure and actual structure and its impact on observed behavior is the key 
to finding leverage points for policy initiatives. For the theorist, the system dynamics 
paradigm builds on the notion that structure causes behavior. For the public a deep 
understanding of the structure of taxation may reduce opposition to oil taxes and hence policy 
reversal.  
 
Prior studies show that mental models- 
• tend to focus on salient relationships 
– Closeness in time and space 
 
• Miss out on: 
– Side effects 
– Feedback effects 
To give evidence of such misperceptions, this paper tests participants‘ level of understanding 
of fuel taxes by testing five elements: 
 
 Tests peoples understanding of the decision (whether to tax Petroleum products or not) 
 Tests peoples understanding of the size of the impact of the decision 
 Tests peoples understanding of the timing of the effects of tax (whether its‘ important 
effects would be in the short or long run. 
 Tests peoples understanding of the general effects of tax. 




3. Methodology  
3.1 Experimental Design 
The experiment used a combination of limited information and limited outcome feedback 
allowing for learning. We use survey responses from a web-based internet mail questionnaire 
sent out in February 2010 to a random sample of 300 individuals from the adult population 
aged 18–65, gathered from a social networking source (Face book, 
http://www.facebook.com/). In total 119 individuals returned the questionnaire (net response 
rate 39.6%).In total, 77 questionnaires were fully completed and available for analysis. The 
questionnaire itself was designed in such a way to prevent subjects from returning to 
previously answered questions and changing their answers, thereby distorting the overall 
output of the survey.  
 
Use of Facebook in collection of responses for surveys  
Face book is a social networking service that allows you to connect and share with the people 
in your life. It is a very powerful social networking tool. This was the choice of method used 
for transferring and collection of responses for the survey. Its advantages in survey collection 
include; its ease of transferability of survey to other members on users‘ page, this allows for a 
larger number of responses. Additionally, it is a free service, and its privacy settings allows 
for restrictions on those who see and fill out the survey.  
 
The most common problem for surveys on facebook is that they are not randomized, this 
could lead to self-selection bias. According to the  New Dominion Philanthropy Metrics, 
unfortunately, the friends and family who volunteer to take surveys often have more in 
common with each other than they do with the whole group the facilitator is trying to assess. 
Voluntary surveys often attract only the happiest and unhappiest participants, which skews the 
survey data beyond repair. Even some randomized surveys suffer from problems when 
potential respondents can easily opt-out of taking a survey. This is known as non-respondent 
bias.  
 
Laboratory experiments vs. Survey questionnaires.   
Surveys are the most popular form of measurement because they seem to be straightforward, 
easy and relatively cheap compared to the alternatives. On the other hand the use of 
Laboratory experiments in economics and system dynamics have become an important source 
of data. The latter allows one to benefit from repeated outcome feedback Moxnes (2004) and 
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hence mistakes made at earlier stages can be corrected later on. Questionnaires do not usually 
allow for this pedagogical aspect. To make up for this deficiency,  in this paper‘s survey, 
more information is provided as the respondents progress along the survey , earlier questions 
are also repeated at later stages in order to allow and test  for learning effects.  
 
3.2 Benchmarks 
Moxnes(2007) asserts that  people misperceive the effects of fuel taxes on profitability in the 
trucking industry in the long run. In the short term an increase in taxes has a downward 
pressure on profits but this is short-lived, in the long run profits return to their normal levels, 
this is what Adam Smith referred to as the ‗‘invisible hand‘‘. Moxnes (2007) makes an 
interesting observation that, the ‗‘invisible hand‘‘ appears to be literally invisible to the public 
in the context of fuel taxes. Other studies Sterner (2007) have also shown that people 
misperceive the timing and effects of these taxes.  In order to illustrate these misperceptions, 




Figure 5: Visible causal loop diagram of perceived effects of tax on trucker profits. 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the relationship that is obvious to the public, the relationship that causes an 
upsurge. The popular notion here is that an increase in taxes causes an increase in costs to 
truckers and hence a reduction in profits, this is the causal links that lead to resistance to such 

















What does the public overlook? The causal loop diagram also shows a feedback loop by 
which lower profits lead to higher trucker profits in the long term. Thus, there is a balancing 
effect on profits. First, low profits lead to reduced investments. Then over time, the stock of 
trucks will grow more slowly than it would do otherwise. Fewer trucks imply less competition, 
which lead to higher prices and higher incomes for the truckers, Moxnes (2007). The 
balancing effects represent the normal workings of a well functioning market system. To 
further illustrate this phenomenon, Moxnes(2007) makes some simulations; first without the 
‗invisible hand effect and then with the workings of the ‗invisible hand‘. Figure 7 and Figure 
















+ Fuel tax 
Costs 
to 




















Figure 7. Results of simulations without ‗invisible hand‘ (Source Moxnes 2007)) 
 
 
Figure 8. Results of simulations with ‗invisible hand‘ (Source Moxnes 2007) 
 
As can be seen from Figure 7 above, when the ‗invisible hand is decoupled the profits do 
reduce throughout the simulation however the effect is not that much. With the inclusion of 
the invisible hand in the model (Figure 8), in the first few years (short term) profits begin to 
decline and competition reduces, this pushes back up the pricing of trucking services, causing 

































































Figure 9: Causal loop diagram for the effect of taxes on the economy 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the general effects of taxes on the economy as a whole. The blue lines in 
Figure 9 shows the hypothetical part of the tax structure that represents what is obvious and 
felt of taxes by the general public. The delayed multiplier effect (R1 & R2) of government 
expenditure is ignored and not taken into consideration. This is typically the case because of 
evoked emotions and feelings of the general public when it comes to tax issues (2007a). It is 
easy to decipher the immediate effects of taxes whether directly or indirectly on private 
investment and consumption and hence the welfare effects. However people may ignore the 
reallocation of tax revenues to government expenditure, which in turn is expected to increase 
capital, resulting in future higher incomes and finally more potential purchases (R3). The 
immediate effects on income however, may cloud the judgment of the general public, hence 
resulting in increased pressure on government to reduce tax rates. A reduction in taxes then 
defeats the purpose of the tax, and reduces government revenue for expenditure on social 
capital. Sterman (2000) asserts that people generally adopt an open loop view of causality, 
ignoring feedback processes.   
 
Another important structure that is ignored by the public is the impact of energy taxes on 
energy efficiency. Higher energy tax rates increases energy prices, this is anticipated to 
increase energy efficiency (i.e. Energy use per unit GDP) over time as it provides the 
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necessary pressure on households to find alternative sources of energy and become more 
efficient in their energy usage. An increase in energy efficiency reduces energy demands. This 
effect weakens all the other feedback loops, including the most obvious impact of taxes on 
consumption (B3), the stronger the energy efficiency the weaker the impact of energy taxes 
on consumption as households become less dependent on energy.  Of course, this factor may 
also significantly reduce revenue from such taxes; however the overall advantages and 
efficiency gains of this tax should far offset this loss. Additionally energy taxes are primarily 
implemented to correct market failures.  
 
Another significant factor to consider in the budget structure is the time element and its 
impact on misperceptions and ‗tax illusions‘, the multiplier effect has delayed long run effects, 
whereas the effect on consumption after tax increases is heavily endured in the short run. The 
timing may account for some misperceptions.  
 
These structural effects, generally ignored by the public serves as a benchmark for this 
experiment. To test for possible structural misperceptions, the participants are asked directly 
about their tax level decisions, their opinion on the size of the effect of a fuel tax and the 
timing of the effect of the fuel tax, the responses are then compared to the optimal closed loop 
structure.  
 
3.3 Hypothesis for misperceptions 
 
H0: Rational Expectations 
Traditional economic assumptions assert that individuals are rational beings and make rational 
decisions; this experiment seeks to challenge these assertions. The complicated and 
anomalous explanations for public opposition to gasoline taxes suggest that it would be futile 
to attempt to explain public attitudes towards gasoline taxes solely by economic rational actor 
models Hsu et al (2003).  
 
Hypothesis to test for misperceptions of feedback ‘invisible hand’ and delays. 
To test for possible misperceptions of dynamic systems we investigate three hypotheses based 
on the respondents‘ decisions and their perceptions of size and timing of the effect of diesel 
taxes on profitability in the trucking industry.  
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H1:  Individuals are less likely to support an increase in diesel taxes due to opposition of 
fuel taxes.  
A large number of works have shown that people are less willing to support an increase in tax 
levels (Hammar et al (2004) Hsu et al (2003), Moxnes(2007),(2010)). Environmental taxes 
have been met with widespread opposition; this is unfortunate as economists see these forms 
of taxes as pigouvian, correcting market failures. The hypothesis hence tests the level of 
opposition for fuel taxes. The null hypothesis is H0, that people make rational decisions. 
 
H2: Individuals misperceive the size of the effect of a diesel tax on profitability in the 
trucking industry 
The null hypothesis is the benchmark response of a small effect of taxes on profitability in the 
trucking industry based on the simulations in Figure 8. 
 
H3:  Individuals misperceive the timing of the effect of a diesel tax on profitability in the 
trucking industry. 
The null hypothesis is the benchmark response of a short term effect of diesel taxes on 
profitability in the trucking industry based on the simulations in Figure 8. 
 
H4. An individual is less likely to prefer increases of taxes even when informed of its 
beneficial effects on emission control. 
Sterman and Sweeney (2002) assert that people generally misperceive the dynamics of 
climate change and that public attitudes about climate change reveal a contradiction. The 
possibility of misperceptions, in this research, were tested by stating fuel taxes can be used to 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and giving participants options to decide on the 
appropriate tax change direction repeatedly.  The purpose was to determine whether subjects 
would be willing to increase the tax level to support emission control. The null hypothesis a 
preference for an increase in diesel taxes as it reduces emissions of greenhouse gases, based 
on the rational expectation theory. 
 
H5: Misperceive the implicit costs in subsidizing fuel costs locally in oil producing 
countries 
A recent study Coady et al (2007) demonstrate that when oil exporting countries do not adjust 
domestic prices of fuel product prices to reflect world prices, they forgo all the revenues that 
they could have received had they put in place taxes. Subsidies also increase domestic 
consumption, however from a revenue raising point of view, every barrel of oil consumed 
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locally could have been exported for higher revenues internationally, indicating a cost. This 
can be described as an implicit subsidy. Despite its costs, many oil exporting countries 
continue to subsidize or charge low taxes on their petroleum products, examples include 
Libya and Venezuela. Our final hypothesis is based on this misconception that oil producing 
countries need not charge taxes on petroleum products. In order to test this misperception, 
participants are asked directly if they believe such oil producing countries should pay taxes. 
The null hypothesis is the benchmark response that more people would support fuel taxes in 
oil producing nations, based on the rational expectation theory.  
 
Hypothesis to test for misperceptions of effects of fuel taxes on income. 
 H6: Individuals misperceive the effect of taxes on lower income groups  
 
 H7: Individuals misperceive the effect of taxes on their personal economy.  
Some resistance to fuel taxes has been likely related to issues of tax distribution. There is 
concern that poorer members of society will be disproportionately affected by pollution taxes 
(Clinch and Dunne (2006); Dresner et al (2006); Klok et al.(Dresner, Jackson et al. 2006;  
2006 ) 2006) or that such a tax burden will be unfairly distributed (Beuermann and Santarius, 
(2006)).  
 
Regressivity of fuel taxes is an often-cited reason for rejecting gasoline taxes Wachs (2003 ) . 
Linked to the first hypothesis, people generally tend to believe that fuel taxes have an adverse 
impact on their personal income. Whereas that is true in the short term,  a smattering of 
studies (see Litmann (2009), GTZ IFP (2009)  show that in the long run, when elasticity of 
demand is higher people smartly adapt habits and policies and become more efficient in their 
use of fuel, reducing the impact of higher oil prices on their personal income. In reality 
gasoline taxes are less regressive than alternatives forms of transportation financing, such as 
sales taxes, Wachs (2003). The null hypothesis is that people, in accordance to the rational 
expectations theory, correctly perceive the benchmark closed- loop system as shown in Figure 






H8: Willingness to increase taxes is higher if people trust their government to use 
proceeds from fuel tax revenues to the benefit of most people.  
Previous studies show the importance of trust as a factor explaining public support for an 
increased green tax, previous research show that trust in public officials and the legal system 
has a significant positive effect on tax morale, H. Hammar(2006), Klok et al. (2006).  
 
Resistance to gasoline taxes has a number of demonstrated sources. Studies from Germany, 
Denmark, Ireland, France and the UK have demonstrated that some resistance to pollution 
taxes derives from the fact that the public does not trust politicians to spend environmental 
taxes solely on environmental measures, Beuermann and Santarius, (2006); Clinch and Dunne, 
(2006); Deroubaix and Le´ ve`que (2006); Dresner et al. (2006). 
 
In order to test this relationship, participants are asked if they trust that their home 
government would spend revenues on income taxes well. I explore for possible relationships 
between trust of government use of tax revenues and participant decision on tax levels. 
 
Exploratory tests 
In addition to the above stated key hypotheses we will explore for other factors that may have 
bearing on willingness to support fuel taxes: 
 I will test whether fuel taxes are more acceptable if packaged with a revenue 
recycling scheme. 
It has long been thought that revenue recycling of fuel tax revenues, would overcome some 
political opposition to taxes, Buchanan and Tullock (1975). This scheme could take the form 
of income taxes or sales tax rebates to individuals, or, revenues could be spent on improving 
health, education, military strength, technological improvements to reduce dependence on fuel 
oil. A number of empirical studies confirm this revenue recycling schemes, Harrington et al 
(2001 ); Krupnick (2001 ); Thalmann (2004). To test this hypothesis, the survey directly asks 
subjects to choose which revenue recycling schemes options they would be more likely to 
support if coupled with an increase in taxes, as well as the ones that would be of most benefit 
to them.  
 
 I will explore for the most ‗visible‘ consequences of diesel taxes to the respondents.  
Preliminary studies show that people are more likely to report the most obvious, direct 
negative effects of taxes, and forget beneficial effects of taxes Moxnes (2010). The survey 
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asks participants to list, from their own knowledge, in a ranking order, what they believe the 
consequences of fuel taxes would be. 
 
 I will explore for possible relationship between decision on level of diesel taxes and 
the size of its effect on profitability in the trucking industry 
It is expected that if participants believe that the size of the effect of a tax on profitability is 
large they are less likely to support an increase in diesel taxes.  
 
 I will explore for possible relationship between decision on level of diesel taxes and 
the timing of its effect on profitability in the trucking industry 
It is expected that if participants believe that the timing of the effect would be in the long term 
they are not likely to support increases in fuel taxes and vice versa. 
 
 I will explore for possible relationship between the size and the timing of the effect of 
diesel taxes on profitability in the trucking industry 
 
 I will compare the results of the survey on the decision of tax level, size and timing of 
the effect on profitability to preliminary work undertaken by Moxnes (2010)  
 
 I will test if there a significant difference in the mean decisions on tax levels across 
age groups. 
Studies Thalmann (2004), Hammar et al (2006) have shown some significant differences in 
decisions across group, we test for these differences in the sample. 
 
 I will test if there is a significant difference in the mean trust of government to use 
incomes from fuel tax beneficially, across countries? 
Research works by Hammar and Jagers (2006) have shown that support for climate policy is 
very dependent on trust of politicians; we test for trust levels of government across countries, 
to explain for national support for fuel taxes.  
 
 I will test if there is a significant change in participants‘ decisions of the diesel tax 
level in question 1 following more information on potential benefits of fuel taxes in 
later questions?   
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This tests the propensity for individuals to make different decisions when faced with the same 
questions at the beginning and ending stages of the survey, giving that more information is 
available as they progress the survey, testing learning. 
3.4 The Questionnaire  
There were four versions of the survey, in different currencies to cater for subjects from 
different nationalities. The four currencies were: British Pound (£), Ghana Cedi (GHS), 
Norwegian Kroner (Kroner) and USD ($). The survey itself was divided into two (2) sub-
sections, 15 pages and contained 24 questions in total. The first section dealt with questions to 
test subjects‘ decision (subjects‘ willingness to support fuel taxes), size of decision, timing 
and effect of decisions. The remainder of the questions sought to collect demographic 
information, such as age, gender, level of income and education, transportation information, 
such as vehicle ownership, vehicle type, and commuting frequency and length. 
 
To tests for possible misperceptions, the first four questions (Question 1, 2, 3 and 4) directly 
test participants understanding of the feedback structure and workings of the ‗invisible hand‘. 
The questions stated the effects of fuel taxes on emissions and tested participants‘ decisions 
on level, understanding of the size and timing and possible effects of fuel taxes respectfully. 
Coded responses were used for Q1toQ3; Q4 however was an open ended question and sought 
to deduce participants‘ general knowledge on broad effects of fuel taxes. 
 
To test for possible misperceptions of climate change Question 1 stated the effects of taxes on 
emissions and tested participants willingness to increase the tax level due to emission control 
and effect on the environment. Question 4, an open-ended question, in this context, sought to 
discover the consciousness level and importance of fuel-based environmental problems in the 
sample group.  
 
Misperceptions of impact of fuel taxes on income is tested by directly asking participants in 
Question 5 and Q10, how an increase in fuel taxes would affect their personal economy and 
which income group they believe would benefit the most from government spending of tax 
incomes 
 
In order to test the misperception that oil producing nations should pay lower taxes, Question 
7 in the survey directly asks participants if they believe such countries should pay taxes. 
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To test for a possible relationship between trust and willingness to pay tax, participants are 
directly asked in Q. 6, if they trust that their home government would spend revenues on 
income taxes efficiently.  
 
Finally to test a revenue recycling hypothesis, the survey directly asks subjects in Q8, Q 9 and 
11 to choose which revenue recycling schemes options they believe government would spend 
the majority of tax proceeds on as well as the ones that would be of most benefit to them and 
finally, which possible allocation options they would be more likely to support if coupled with 
an increase in taxes. Q8 and Q9 was an open ended question allowing for full responses from 
participants own knowledge, whereas Q 11 was coded  allowing for multiple responses, this 
ensured that the participants chose as many options from those given, that they found 
agreeable. The revenue recycling options for fuel tax proceeds in Q11 were as follows: Health, 
education, military strength, Research and development, combination of all four purposes, 
direct return of contributed tax proceeds to inhabitants, reduction of VAT, and reduction of 
income taxes. The purpose of the coding of Q11 is to reveal a little more information on the 
potential effects of fuel taxes through the options available.  This question is immediately 
followed by a repeat of Q1 the tax level decision based on emissions, to see if responses 
change based on additional information given in Q11, consequently testing learning as a 
complement to the main hypothesis.  
 
3.5 Statistical Analyses  
All hypotheses were tested using frequencies to illustrate the proportion of responses 
allocated for the relevant options. In additions to the use of frequency tables, H1, 
misperceptions of the ‗invisible hand‘ was tested using multiple response tables to explore 
frequency relationships between the decision to increase diesel taxes and two independent 
variables; the effect of such taxes on profitability in the trucking industry as well as profits 
overtime To explore the relationship between the decisions on the diesel tax level (Q.1) and 
other variables or possible predictors a multiple regression analyses was employed. A one 
sample t-test was used to compare the means of the responses in Q1 to Q3 to the benchmark 
options.  To compare for difference in the responses in question 1 (decision of tax level) and 
later when it was repeated in Q13, a Paired sample T-test and its non parametric alternative 
(Wilcoxan signed rank test) was used, testing learning. Independent sample t-test was 
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employed to compare the mean score across gender, age and other categories to explore for 
other factors that may explain some variations in the decisions of the tax level. Chi square 
goodness of fit was used to compare the proportion of cases in Q1, 2, and 3 (decision of tax 
level, size and timing of effect of diesel taxes) to those obtained from a preliminary research 
undertaken by Moxnes (2010).  
 
3.6 Other design issues  
Subjects 
Some descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3 below. In general the sampled populations 
had higher levels of education, drove and used private transport more frequently and were 








































Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Nationality Percent Highest level of 
education 
Percent 
1 Norwegian 26.8 2 High School 1.4 
2 Ghanaian 62.0 3 Some University 25.4 
3 British 7.0 4 Graduated from 
University 
73.2 
4 American 1.4 Total 100.0 
5 other 2.8   
Total 100.0   
    
Age Percent Gender Percent 
1 25 or younger 49.3 1 Male 60.6 
2 26 to 35 years 40.8 2 Female 39.4 
3 36 to 45 years 4.2 Total 100.0 






If you are/were a 
student what field of 
study? 
Percent Current Occupation Percent 
1 Business 33.3 1 Student 48.6 
2 Social Science 24.6 2 accounting 4.3 
3 Natural Science 17.4 3 Banking 5.7 
4 Medical and health 
science 
14.5 4 Administrative 14.3 
5 Humanities 7.2 5 consulting 2.9 
6 System dynamics 2.9 6 Health worker 2.9 
Total 100.0 8 other 21.4 
  
Total                                 100.0 
  
  
Mode of transport Percent   
Car/Taxi 84.6   
Bus 72.3   
Airplane 58.46   
Train 43.08   
Walking 43.08   
Bicycling 70.77   
Other 10.8   









4. Results  
 
Misperceptions of ‘invisible hand’ hypothesis  
 
H1:  Individuals are less likely to support an increase in diesel taxes due to opposition of 
fuel taxes.  
Results from the frequencies to test for H1 are shown in Table 7, and the one sample t- test is 
shown in Table 8 (Appendix b).     
 
The One Sample T Test 
The interest is in the two-tail test, so the P-value shown under the ‗sig.(2-tailed)‘ column is 
0.000 is used. One can safely reject H0 in favor of H1.  The results of the T test reveal that 
there is sufficient evidence at the 5% level to conclude that the mean values of the decision on 
the diesel tax level is different from the benchmark option of increasing the diesel tax level. 
Statistically less people support an increase in diesel taxes.   
 
H2: Individuals misperceive the size of the effect of a diesel tax on profitability in the 
trucking industry.   
Results from the frequencies to test for H2 are shown in Table 9, and the one sample t-test 
result is shown in Table 10 (Appendix b).  
 
The results of the one sample test for the size of the effect on profitability in the trucking 
industry reveals that at the 5% level the mean value of the sample is similar to the benchmark 
value that the size of the effect is small, P-value = 0.227 >0.05. Hence we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis and rather reject the alternate hypothesis. 
 
H3:  Individuals misperceive the timing of the effect of a diesel tax on profitability in the 
trucking industry. 
Results from the frequencies to test for H3 are shown in Table 11, and the one sample t-test 
result is shown in Table 12 (Appendix b).  
 
The results of the One sample T-test reveal that there is sufficient evidence at the 5% level to 
conclude that the mean values for the responses on the timing of the effect of diesel taxes on 
profitability in the trucking industry are different from the benchmark options of profitability 
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being reduced mostly in the first half year, P-value=0.000 <0.05. Hence with regards to this 
hypothesis, we can safely reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternate, H3. 
 
H4. An individual is less likely to prefer increases of taxes even when informed of its 
beneficial effects on emission control. 
Results from the frequencies to test for H4 are shown in Table 7, and the one sample t-test 
result is shown in Table 8 (Appendix b).  
 
Using the one sample test results, we can safely reject H0 in favor of H1. There is sufficient 
evidence at the 5% level to conclude that the mean chosen option of the sample group is 
different from the benchmark option of increasing diesel tax levels to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases.  
 
H5: Misperceive the implicit costs in subsidizing fuel costs locally in oil producing 
countries 
Results from the one sample t-test to test for H5 are shown in Table 13 (Appendix b).   
 
The results of the one sample test indicate that there is no evidence at the 5% level to suggest 
that the mean value of the options chosen by the subjects regarding whether oil exporting 
countries should pay fuel taxes is different from the benchmark response of agreement, P-
value = 0.150 > 0.05. In this case we fail to reject the null hypothesis.  
 
H6: Individuals misperceive the effect of taxes on lower income groups  
To test for this hypothesis and in effect exploring the relationship between tax decisions and 
expected effects on income groups, multiple regression analysis and correlation statistic were 
employed. The results of the regression are shown in Appendix a. The results of the 
correlations are shown in Table 33 and Table 34 (Appendix g.)    
 
The relationship between the decision by subjects, on the tax level and its expected effect on 
the different income groups was investigated using spearman‘s rank order correlation. 
Preliminary analyses showed some violation of the assumptions of normality, hence the use of 
the non-parametric alternative. There was a very weak, negative relationship between the two 
variables, r = -0.058, n= 74, p>0.05, with decisions to increase tax level associated with 
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subject‘s belief that higher income groups would benefit the most from government spending 
of incomes.  
 
Similar to the correlation results the regression results display a weak but positive relationship 
between the perceived effects on the various income groups and the level of diesel taxes. Our 
model
9
 which included the variable of interest explained 6.3% of the variance in the decision 
on the diesel tax level. The model does not reach statistical significance (Sig = .777 > 0.05), 
however it may be interesting to take note of the beta coefficients to compare the contribution 
of each independent variable to the decision on tax levels. Respondents‘ choices on which 
income group would benefit the most from tax proceed contributed for 4.9% of the variance 
in the decision. The fourth largest contributor to the dependent variable, in the model. 
 
H7: Individuals misperceive the effect of taxes on their personal economy  
Results of the Spearman‘s Rank order Correlation for the perceived effect of taxes on 
participants‘ personal economy is shown in Table 37 (Appendix g) and the frequency table for 
effect of fuel taxes on personal economy is shown in Table 17. 
 
Table 4 shows that a larger proportion of the sample tend to believe that an increase in fuel 
taxes will negatively affect their personal economy (84,4%). The relationship between the 
decision of participants on the diesel tax level and the perceived effect of an increase in fuel 
taxes on their personal economy was investigated using Spearman‘s rank order correlation. 
The results indicate a weak (small) positive correlation between the two variables, r = 0.104, 
n= 65, p>0.05, with higher perceived positive effects of fuel taxes on personal economy 
associated with higher (increased) levels of diesel taxes.  
 
 
Similar to the correlation results, there is a weak, positive relationship between the perceived 
effects on personal economy and the level of diesel taxes. Our model which includes the 
variable of interest, explains 6.3% of the variance in the decision on the diesel tax level. 
Respondents‘ choices on the effects of fuel taxes on personal economy contributed for 13.5% 
                                                 
9
 The model  included the  following independent variables: Highest level of education, Gender, Consider your 
own energy consumption for private use. How much energy do you think you use compared to the energy use of 
the average inhabitant of your home country?, Which income group do you think would benefit the most from 
government spending of tax incomes?, f you are/were a student what field of study?, Age,  Do you trust that your 
home government would use incomes from fuel taxes to the benefit of most people, Current Occupation, If all 
fuel prices increase by 20 % due to new fuel taxes, how do you think this will influence your personal economy? 
Nationality. 
 48 
of the variance in the decision on the tax level, the third largest contributor in the model to the 
dependent variable.  
 
H8: Willingness to increase taxes is higher if people trust their government to use 
proceeds from fuel tax revenues to the benefit of most people.  
To explore for possible relationship between trust and willingness to pay tax, linear regression 
analyses and correlation was employed. The results of the correlation are shown in  
Table 36 (Appendix g), the regression analysis results are shown in (Appendix a.). 
 
 
The relationship between the decision of participants on the diesel tax level and the level of 
trust of government was investigated using Spearman‘s rank order correlation. The results 
indicate a weak (small) positive correlation between the two variables, r = 0.034, n= 65, 
p<0.05, with higher perceived level of trust of government to use incomes from fuel taxes 
beneficially, associated with higher chosen increase of levels of diesel taxes.  
 
 
 The correlation results (Table 36) reveals that our model on the whole which includes 
subjects opinion on effects of taxes on personal economy, trust of government to use fuel 
taxes beneficially, as well as their perceptions on which income group would benefit the most 
from fuel taxes explains 6.6% of the variance in the decision on diesel tax level made by 
subjects. Trust of government according to the results does not correlate substantially with the 
decision on the diesel tax level, correlation (0.264). Of the three independent variables, trust 
of government makes the second largest unique contribution 18.1% (beta = 0.181). We fail to 
reject the null hypothesis based on the weak relationship; trust of government does not 
significantly explain variance in decisions on diesel tax level.  
 
Similar to the correlation results there is a weak but positive relationship between the level of 
trust of governments to use tax revenues well and the level of diesel taxes. The variable on the 
level of trust of government to use taxes to the benefit of all makes the strongest unique 
contribution to explaining the decision on the tax level (Beta = 0.135, 13.5%) when the 





Exploration of most popular revenue recycling options from proceeds of fuel taxes. 
Frequency tables and graphs were employed to illustrate the most popular and the least 
popular revenue recycling scheme use of fuel tax incomes.  
 
Table 4. Frequency table for responses on revenue recycling of fuel taxes 
 
Would you accept a 5Gp per liter increase in fuel taxes if:    Tick off none or as many of 




























Count 50 48 6 52 26 7 20 21 
Total 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 
Percent 67.6 64.9 8.1 70 35.1 9 27.03 28.4 
 
 
Table 4 shows that when subjects were faced with a closed question allowing for multiple 
responses, the sample tended to support the increase in taxes when proceeds are allocated to 
research and development to reduce dependence on oil (70%). Health and Education followed 
in second and third place, (67.6%) (64.9%) respectfully. The least support went to allocation 
of proceeds to increase military strength (8.1%) and splitting of proceeds amongst inhabitants 
(9%).  
 
Table 5. Frequency Table for responses on most beneficial governmental use of fuel tax proceeds.  
What likely governmental uses of revenues from fuel taxes will be of most benefit to 
you? 
 Category Counts Total Percentages 
1 Education 15 68 22.1 
2 Health 18 68 26.5 
3 Distributional issues 1 68 1.47 
4 Security 1 68 1.47 
5 Water 3 68 4.41 
6 electricity 2 68 2.94 
7 road infrastructure 12 68 17.6 
8 environment  4 68 5.88 
9 alternative energy sources 8 68 11.8 
10 public transport 14 68 20.6 
11 
critical attitudes and misuse of 
funds 0 68 0 
12 reduce other taxes 1 68 1.47 
13 employment and wages 4 68 5.88 
14 agriculture 1 68 1.47 






Figure 10: Bar chart for responses on most beneficial governmental allocation of tax 
revenues  
 
 Alternatively when subjects were faced with an open question to list what likely 
governmental uses of revenues from fuel taxes will be of most benefit to them, Figure 10 and 
Table 5 above,  shows that the most popular response was for the provision of Health (26.5%) 
and Educational facilities (22.1%). Road infrastructure was fairly popular (17.6%). The least 
beneficial to respondents were reduction in other taxes (1.47%), security (1.47%) and 














Exploration of most ‘visible’ effects of diesel taxes.  
 
Table 6. Frequency Table showing responses on effects of taxes 
 
Assume that there will be a significant tax on all uses of energy that leads to emissions of 
greenhouse gases. What consequences will such a tax have? Mention as many effects as 
you can think of. 
 
Category Counts Total Percent 
Direct cost increases 13 77 16.88 
General cost effect 27 77 35.06 
Reduced use of energy 19 77 24.68 
Energy efficiency 7 77 9.091 
Use of alternative energy sources 24 77 31.17 
Consciousness about energy and 
environment 13 77 16.88 
Emissions of CO2 17 77 22.08 
Other environmental conditions  77 0 
Economic activity  77 0 
Distributional issues 3 77 3.896 
Governmental revenues 3 77 3.896 
Reductions in other taxes  77 0 
More public services 1 77 1.299 
National competitiveness  77 0 
Critical attitudes 7 77 9.091 
Other 14 77 18.18 
 
 
Figure 11: Bar chart showing responses on effects of taxes 
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Frequency table results  
 
When the sample were faced with an open question, to list the consequences of such a tax, 
Figure 11 and Table 6  shows that the largest proportion mentioned general cost effects on 
prices of other goods and services (35.06%). The second most popular option was an increase 
in the use of alternative energy sources (31%). In addition a relatively large number also refer 
to a reduction in the use of energy (24.68%). A moderate number (22.08%) mention 
emissions of CO2
 
  and are conscious of relationship between energy and environment 
(16.88%). Very few mention energy efficiency gains, or the provision of more public services. 
There was no mention of reductions in other taxes.  
 
Exploration of possible relationship between decision by respondents on diesel tax level 
and the perceived size of the effect on profitability in the trucking industry 
The multiple response tables in Table 30 (Appendix f), gives an interesting insight into the 
relationship between the subjects‘ decision on diesel tax level and their opinion on the size of 
its effect on profitability in the trucking industry. A larger proportion of the sample tend to be 
more willing to reduce diesel tax level when they believe that profitability will be reduced 
much, row %  (46.7%). Concurrently, those who believe that profitability will be reduced a 
little have the highest proportion of decisions to keep the current diesel tax level row % 
(45.5%). From the table, the largest proportion of those who believe that profitability will not 
change also choose to increase the diesel tax level row % (16.2%). Finally, a higher 
proportion of those who believe profitability will increase a little decide to reduce diesel tax 
row % (13.3%).  
 
Exploration of possible relationship between decision by respondents on diesel tax level 
and the perceived timing of the effect on profitability in the trucking industry  
The multiple response tables in Table 31 (Appendix f) shows some relationship between the 
decision on diesel tax level and their opinion on its effect on profits over time. It shows that 
when participants believe that profitability will be reduced in the short term a large proportion 
of the sample, Col% (54.1%), go with an increase in the tax level or to keep the current diesel 
tax level (54.5%).  When participants believe that profitability will be reduced mostly in the 
long run a large proportion, Col % (26.7%), go with a reduction in the tax level. The highest 
proportion of those who chose profitability having the same effect in the long run and short 
run also chose to reduce the diesel tax level Col% (33.3%). 
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Exploration of possible relationship between the respondents perceived size of the effect 
and the timing of the effect of diesel taxes on profitability in the trucking industry. 
The multiple response tables in Table 32 (Appendix f.) display the relationship between the 
samples opinions on the size of the effect of a tax on trucker profits and its effects on profits 
over time. It   shows that a larger proportion Col % (61.3%) of participants who chose 
profitability being reduced mostly in the first half year also chose profitability being reduced a 
little. If respondents believe that effects on profits are more in the long term, a larger 
proportion, col % (24%) believe profitability will be reduced a much. The proportions who 
believe the impact on profits will be the same in the short run and long run predominantly also 
believe profitability will be reduced a little, col% (22.6%).  
 
 
Tests to compare the results of the survey on the decision of tax level, size and timing of 
the effect on profitability to preliminary work undertaken by Moxnes (2010)   
The one sample t-test of Moxnes(2010) shown in Table 14, 15, 16 (Appendix b) reveals that 
for hypothesis H1, H2 and H3 based on preliminary results where similar questions to this 
work are posed we can safely reject all the null and accept the alternate hypotheses (p-value 
=0,000<0.05). 
 
Additionally, the Chi-Square goodness of fit test, shown in Table 19, 21 and 23 (Appendix c) 
indicates that there was significant difference in all the options chosen in my studies sample 
group as compared with the values, in the sample group that was obtained in a preliminary 
study by Moxnes (2010) for questions on decision on the level of tax, the effect of this tax on 
trucker profits and the timing of the effect.  
 
Tests for whether there is a significant difference in the mean decisions on tax levels 
across age groups and Nationality? 
The results of the Independent Sample T-test used to explore relationships between the 
decision variable (tax level) and descriptive categorical variables such as Age and Nationality 
are shown in Appendix d.   
 
The independent sample T- Test conducted to compare subjects‘ decisions on the diesel tax 
level for Norwegians and Ghanaians (refer to Table 24 (Appendix d)) shows that there was a 
significant difference in responses for Norwegians (M = 2,68) and Ghanaians, M = 2,30); t= 
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2,037, p = .047 (two tailed). The magnitude of the differences in the means was moderate (eta 
squared = .063) and lies between 0.006 and 0.772. 
  
To compare across age groups, an independent sample T-test was conducted to compare 
subjects‘ decisions on the level of diesel taxes for the age groups 26 to 35 years and 36 to 45 
years, (refer to Table 25). There was a significant difference in scores for age group 26 – 35 
yrs (M = 2.41) and age group 36 to 45 years (M = 1.33); t (2,198), p = ,036.  The magnitude 
of the difference in the means was large (eta squared = 0.139) and lies between 0.007 and -
0.104.  
 
Moreover, an independent sample T-test was conducted to compare subjects‘ decisions on the 
level of diesel taxes for the age groups 36 to 45 years and 46 years or older, (see, Table 26 
(Appendix d)). There was a significant difference in scores for age group 36 – 45 yrs (M = 
1,33) and age group 45 yrs or older ( M = 3) ; t (2,988), p = ,031.  The magnitude of the 
difference in the means was very large (eta squared = 0.56) and lies between 0.007 and -
0.104.    
 
 
Test for significant difference in the mean trust of government use of incomes from fuel 
tax beneficially, across nationalities 
An independent sample t-test was conducted to compare the level of trust of government to 
use tax proceeds well amongst Norwegians and Ghanaians (see Table 27, (Appendix d)). 
There was a significant difference in scores for Norwegians (M=3.21, SD = 1.084) and 
Ghanaians; M = 2.48, SD = 0.927; t = 2,736, p=.008 (two-tailed). The magnitude of the 
differences in the means was very large (eta squared = .11) Cohen (1988). 
 
Tests for whether there is a significant change in participants’ decisions of the diesel tax 
level in question 1 by question 13 where question 1 is repeated, following more 
information.    
A Paired sample t-test was conducted to evaluate the impact of more information being 
provided in the survey as subjects progressed along (mostly information of possible effects of 
diesel taxes), on their decision of diesel tax levels at the end of the survey (test for learning) 
(refer to  Table 28 and 29 (Appendix e).  There was no statistical significant difference in the 
mean scores in Question 1, ―Diesel taxes can be used to reduce emissions of greenhouse 
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gases. If you were to decide the level of the diesel tax for all uses in transportation, would 
you,‖ to the repeated question at a later stage in the survey, question (13), P-value: 0.374 
>0.05.  
5. Discussion  
 
Misperceptions of invisible hand 
Misperceptions of feedback structure and delays were tested for on three levels, decision on 
direction of change of tax level, size and timing of the effect of fuel taxes on profitability in 
the trucker industry. The results showed that on two levels decision and timing there were 
clear misperceptions. Considering the size of the effect the results show that a larger 
proportion chose the right option of profitability being reduced mostly in the short term. With 
regards to the decision, though 48% of respondents chose to increase the diesel tax level, yet 
still 52% did not choose this option. There is clearly a bias in the participants‘ perception of 
the timing of the effect; 48% of the respondents chose more effect on profitability, in the short 
term and 52% did not choose this option.  What are the possible reasons for this bias?  
 
The main hypothesis that motivated this research was the link between the choice of in-
optimal tax levels and misperceptions of dynamic systems in general and delays in particular, 
Sterman (1989b). Even when participants are given information in the question of some 
potential benefits of increasing tax levels, namely a reduction in emissions, the mean decision 
is still biased and a larger percentage chose other options besides increasing taxes, Moxnes 
(2007) points out that people generally tend to dislike taxes; this possible explanation is also 
backed by Hsu et al (2008). People tend to oppose the imposition of taxes and hence it has 
become politically dangerous to propose Nivola and Crandall, (1995), Mankiw,( 2006). This 
may account for the lack of popularity of increasing the tax level.  
 
The results also show that people generally misperceive the timing of the effect of taxes on 
profitability; this is in line with several works on misperceptions Moxnes (2007). Sterman‘s 
(1989a, 1989b) argument that the mental models people use to guide their decisions in 
dynamic settings are flawed in specific ways: that they fail to appreciate time delays between 
action and response and in the reporting of information best explains the result. Delays are 
consistently ignored or underestimated in decision making. 
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Participants seem to perceive the size of the effect of diesel taxes properly, most recognize its 
effects on profitability as little, however, there appears to be misperceptions on the decision 
and the timing of the effect of diesel taxes as compared to the benchmarks. The question to 
reflect on is, if subjects are able to perceive the size of the effects of diesel taxes as small then 
why don‘t more of the subjects support an increase in the diesel tax?  
 
It comes back to the same conclusions that people generally dislike taxes and it appears that 
the size of the effect has a very weak impact on their decision. So far as there is an effect 
whether small or big, people are generally ‗tax intolerant‘. It is important however to 
recognize the weak but nonetheless existent relationship between subject‘s decision on the tax 
level and the size.  
 
There are apparent misperceptions in the decision and the timing of the effect of diesel taxes; 
the one sample t-test results for these two variables were significantly different from the 
benchmark options. The actual relationship between the two variables may contribute and 
explain the biases in the choices of subjects. For instance if subjects believe that the effects of 
diesel taxes will not be only in the short term but may have long term effects then they may be 
less likely to choose to increase taxes. The multiple response tables give evidence to this weak 
relationship. The one sample t-test for the timing of the effect on profitability in comparison 
to the benchmark indicates that the mean responses were not short term effects but long term 
effects, that being  the case, it may have put a slight downward bias on the decision of the tax 
level.  
 
Misperception of climate change hypothesis 
It can be deduced from the results that stating that taxes can reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases does not influence the decision on the tax level. The mean value is still different from 
the benchmark of increasing the tax level. Though the question stated the potential benefits of 
fuel taxes on the environment, this additional information does not sway respondents to 
increase taxes. This result is not surprising, as earlier works by Sterman and Booth Sweeney 
(2002) show that when it comes to climate change issues , the public have an indifferent 
attitude and prefer to take a ‗wait and see‘ approach. As environmental taxes are more 
corrective rather than fiscal, a possible reason for the lack of support for increasing the tax 




Misperceptions of fuel taxes for oil producing nations 
To a large extent the results show that a larger proportion of the sample believes that oil 
producing countries should pay fuel taxes. This result is surprising, however as the questions‘ 
focus was on whether or not to charge fuel taxes and not on the level, respondents may 
generally agree that all countries should pay some form of fuel taxes though not on an upward 
increase of it. Perhaps, some people feel that as they pay taxes in their countries it is only fair 
that all other countries should tax their nationals, as well.  
 
Determinants of willingness to support fuel taxes  
Relationship between willingness to increase diesel taxes and its impact on income groups 
The results of the correlation and regression show a weak, negative relationship, with 
subject‘s believe that higher income groups would benefit the most from tax revenues 
associated with decisions to increase tax level. Similar works, Hammar et al (2006) show that 
people are less likely to support a cut in wealth taxes backing the hypothesis that people 
generally believe that higher income groups should pay more taxes and benefit less from tax 
revenues.  
 
Relationship between willingness to increase diesel taxes and its impact on personal economy 
The results show that a large percentage of the group tends to believe that fuel taxes would 
negatively affect their personal economy. Additionally there is a positive relationship between 
their decision on the tax level and its perceived effect on their personal economy. Gemmell et 
al. (2004) found that self-interest explained a lot of tax preferences. Hence, the more negative 
the individuals perceive the effect on their personal economy the less likely they are to 
support such taxes. The high proportion of individuals who believe that fuel taxes would 
negatively affect their personal economy may partially account for the low support of the 
increase in fuel taxes.  
 
Relationship between trust and willingness to support an increase in diesel taxes 
Studies by Hammar et al (2006) show that, those who distrust politicians do not want to hand 
over too much power and do not trust them to correct market failure in a proper way. This 
may account for the low support for an increase in the tax levels.  
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The results also show that Norwegian individuals in the sample are more likely to trust the 
government to use revenues from fuel taxes beneficially than are Ghanaian individuals. This 
may also account for the results which show that the mean value for Norwegians on the 
decision of tax level is closer to an increase than that of the Ghanaian individuals. The level of 
trust may be dependent on historical factors; Norway is a welfare state and has some of the 
highest energy tax rates in the world. Energy Taxes have been used as a climate policy 
instrument since 1991. In Ghana, however, energy is frequently subsidized, in 2004 energy 
subsidies accounted for 2.2% of GDP , people may be less familiar with this particular form 
of tax. Corruption may also contribute to mistrust of government officials.  
 
Relationship between respondents’ education level and decisions on the tax level 
The results of the regression show a weak positive relationship between the level of education 
and the decision on the tax level. The higher the education, the higher the support for an 
increase in the diesel tax. No better explanation can be offered than Hammar et al (2006) they 
found that information and education decrease the misperception and thereby increase the 
preferred tax levels. The more educated an individual is the more likely he or she is to make 
informed decisions, however the weak relationship shows that misperceptions occur even 
amongst highly educated individuals. System Dynamics teaches that there is a relationship 
between structure and the effect hence teaching the feedback method; research has shown that 
some teaching methods rely on static relationships Wheat ((2007)). Errors and misperceptions 
of dynamics are expected where students are taught using the latter educational methods 
regardless of the level of education.  
 
Relationship between age of respondents and decisions on the tax level 
Results of the Independent sample test show that those aged 46 yrs or older are more likely to 
support an increase in taxes, 36 to 45 yrs are less likely than all the age groups to support an 
increase in taxes. This may be because of vested interest, those who use more petroleum 
products are more likely to be interested in taxing. Gemmell et al. (2004) found that self-
interest explained a lot of tax preferences; this may explain why this particular age group has 
a lower support for an increase in taxes. This age group may be highly affected by fuel taxes 





Test for learning 
As subjects progressed along the survey attention was drawn to benefits of taxes in the 
revenue recycling questions and impact on emissions. I tested for learning and propensity for 
individuals to make different decisions when faced with the same question at different stages, 
it appears that information in the survey has no significant impact on the decision of subjects. 
The majority are still averse to increasing taxes. Even though the options in the survey tips 
respondents on the possible application of revenue recycling, respondents may still believe 
that this scheme is not applicable in their respective countries, respondents may perceive a 
contradiction between theory and practice. Whether these perceptions are accurate or not is 
left for future research.  
 
On the whole, the variables in the regression model did not show significant bearing on the 
decision to increase the tax level. In particular, the variables age and gender had much 
stronger contributions in other works Hammar et al (2006) and Thalmann (2004). Despite 
being weak, the results are still useful as they show the correlation and collinearity of the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The smaller sample size may 
explain the differences in the bearings of the variables.  
 
Revenue recycling scheme  
Revenue recycling scheme, where tax proceeds are returned to tax payers have been 
suggested to reduce opposition to the implementation of environmental taxes Buchanan and 
Tullock, (1975).    The results show some interesting trends ,  when participants are asked a 
closed question with several options , where they can choose multiple answers or choose none 
at all, the support for fuel taxes is a lot higher than the first question on the decision of the tax 
level of diesel taxes. The most popular revenue recycling option was Research and 
development into ways to reduce dependence on oil. As much as 70% voted for this option 
with Health (67.6%) and Education (64.9%) following closely in popularity. There is a vast 
difference in the counts for R&D, provision of Health and educational facilities to the original 
count of individuals who chose to increase diesel taxes to reduce emissions, in the original 
question only about 37 individuals had preference for an increase in taxes, however the 
revenue recycling option of R&D was approximately 1.5 times greater in support (52). 
 
 When one compares the results of the close ended question to the original most visible 
effects, there is a wide gap in the responses. In the open-ended question, asking respondents 
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to list the most visible effects of fuel taxes, very few mention public services (1.2%) and 
energy efficiency (9%) however in the close-ended question people tend to greatly support 
these options; public services have as much as (67%) (65%) and research and development a 
subset of energy efficiency had (70%). The fact that the options in the close ended question 
giving options, gains a lot more support for an increase in taxes than the original question 
gives evidence of some misperceptions , when reporting the effects people generally forget 
the positive effects but when their attention is drawn to it , this has an impact on their support 
of taxes. Similar to preliminary works Moxnes (2010) people generally tend to focus on 
negative effects, distorting their decisions 
 
Interestingly, reduction of other taxes seems to have very low support and is not mentioned at 
all in the open question. One possible explanation may be attributed to the endowment effect, 
the propensity for people to attach greater value to objects in their possession than not 
(Tversky and Kahneman  (1981); Kahneman and Tversky (1984 )). To the extent a gasoline 
tax increase proposes a trade, higher fuel costs in exchange for other tax benefits, the 
endowment effect would predict sluggish less support of such a proposal Hsu et al (2008).  
 
Reported visible effects of diesel taxes  
The results from the frequency tables show that a larger group reports the most direct, obvious 
effects.  The most popular effect that most people felt would be the consequences of the tax 
was a general cost effect, ie effect on prices of other goods and services consumed by 
households that are affected by price changes of fuel. These effects were expected as they are 
closer in time and are more direct. Another reason could be that a larger percentage of the 
sample was Ghanaian; In Ghana, higher petroleum costs are frequently passed on to consumer 
prices. Studies by Coady et al (2005) demonstrate that typically in developing countries the 
bulk of petroleum products are not consumed directly by households but indirectly through 
their consumption of other goods and services that use petroleum products as inputs. 
However, these are short term effects, in the long run when there are efficiency gains, these 
effects balance out. Interestingly, a moderate number also mention an increase in the use of 
alternative energy sources and a reduction in the use of energy and emissions of gases. The 
mention of the reduction in emissions may have resulted from it being stated in the first 
question, where subjects are told that fuel taxes helps to reduce emissions. Very few mention 
efficiency gains or the provision of more public services. There was no mention of reductions 
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in other taxes. These results are very interesting especially when compared to the responses 
on the close ended question  
 
Comparions to preliminary results of Moxnes (2010)  
 Results on the one sample t test from preliminary work done by moxnes reveals similar 
results to this work. It confirms that there is a downward bias in diesel taxes, that people 
misperceive the timing and also the size of the effect. In Moxnes (2010) individuals 
misperceive fuel taxes on all three levels. The preliminary work and this work should give 
strong evidence of mass misperceptions.  
 
 The chi square goodness of fit test indicated that there was a significant difference between 
the results of my work and Moxnes (2010) in terms of frequencies of the options chosen, this 
may have resulted due to the difference in sample sizes, Moxnes (2010) had over 1000 
respondents in comparison to77 responses in this survey. Additionally the preliminary survey 
used only Norwegian respondents whereas this survey got respondents from 4 different 





 The experiment confirms that there is less support for an increase in tax levels regardless of 
its beneficial and corrective effects. The experiment also demonstrates that similar to other 
experiments (Brehmer (1989), Sterman (1989a)), the tendency to misperceive the importance 
of delays has some bearing on the decision variable, in this case support for fuel taxes.  
 
As was recommended by Moxnes (2007), information policies on the consequences of delays 
should be targeted at relevant stakeholders. In addition to recommendations made by Moxnes 
(2007), I would also recommend that government adopt mitigating measures that ensure that 
proceeds from fuel taxes are allocated to the most popular revenue recycling schemes, such as 
the provision of public services and research into alternative sources of energy, as the results 
show that these schemes significantly raise support for fuel taxes. The importance of 
transparency in carrying out these mitigation policies cannot be emphasized enough; it is 
recommended that governments regularly disclose to the public, full accounts of how 
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revenues from fuel taxes are spent. In this way, the public is made aware of exactly where 
revenues are invested; this may perhaps bridge the perception gap between theory and 
practice.  
 
Furthermore the result of the survey adds another dimension to the suggested information 
policies: it shows that information policies alone are not significantly influential, 
policymakers have to decipher the individual importance of certain factors to the public and 
input these factors in information campaigns. Government should hence target mitigation 
schemes that are of greater importance to its nationals in order to gain more support for 
implementation of such taxes. The use of laboratory experiments (where subjects may benefit 
from repeated outcome feedback) to test for the impact of the influential revenue recycling 
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Appendix a. Linear Regression results 
 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Mean Std. Deviation N 
Diesel taxes can be used to 
reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases. If you 
were to decide the level of 
the diesel tax for all uses in 
transportation, would you: 
2,37 ,858 65 
If all fuel prices increase by 
20 % due to new fuel taxes, 
how do you think this will 
influence your personal 
economy? 
1,69 ,900 65 
 Do you trust that your 
home government would 
use incomes from fuel 
taxes to the benefit of most 
people 
2,63 1,054 65 
Age 1,66 ,834 65 
Gender 1,34 ,477 65 
Nationality 1,94 ,808 65 
Consider your own energy 
consumption for private 
use. How much energy do 
you think you use 
compared to the energy 
use of the average 
inhabitant of your home 
country? 
2,88 1,206 65 
f you are/were a student 
what field of study? 2,44 1,446 63 
Current Occupation 3,23 2,701 64 
Which income group do 
you think would benefit the 
most from government 
spending of tax incomes? 
1,82 ,788 65 
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Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,330(a) ,109 -,063 ,885 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Highest level of education, Gender, Consider your own energy consumption for private 
use. How much energy do you think you use compared to the energy use of the average inhabitant of your home 
country?, Which income group do you think would benefit the most from government spending of tax incomes?, f 
you are/were a student what field of study?, Age,  Do you trust that your home government would use incomes 
from fuel taxes to the benefit of most people, Current Occupation, If all fuel prices increase by 20 % due to new 
fuel taxes, how do you think this will influence your personal economy?, Nationality 
b  Dependent Variable: Diesel taxes can be used to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. If you were to decide 






Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4,970 10 ,497 ,635 ,777(a) 
Residual 40,695 52 ,783     
Total 45,665 62       
a  Predictors: (Constant), Highest level of education, Gender, Consider your own energy consumption for private 
use. How much energy do you think you use compared to the energy use of the average inhabitant of your home 
country?, Which income group do you think would benefit the most from government spending of tax incomes?, f 
you are/were a student what field of study?, Age,  Do you trust that your home government would use incomes 
from fuel taxes to the benefit of most people, Current Occupation, If all fuel prices increase by 20 % due to new 
fuel taxes, how do you think this will influence your personal economy?, Nationality 
b  Dependent Variable: Diesel taxes can be used to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. If you were to decide 
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a  Dependent Variable: Diesel taxes can be used to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. If you were to decide 























Appendix b: One Sample Tests  
 
Table 7: Frequency table for decisions on diesel taxes 
 
Diesel taxes can be used to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. If you were to decide the 
level of the diesel tax for all uses in transportation, would you: 
 





Valid Reduce diesel tax 
level 
15 19,5 19,5 19,5 
  Keep the current 
diesel tax level 
22 28,6 28,6 48,1 
  Benchmark 
response: Increase 
diesel tax level 
37 48,1 48,1 96,1 
  Do not know 3 3,9 3,9 100,0 
  Total 77 100,0 100,0   
 
Table 8: One-Sample Test for decisions on diesel tax as compared to benchmark 
 
  








Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Diesel taxes can be 
used to reduce 
emissions of 
greenhouse gases. If 
you were to decide the 
level of the diesel tax 
for all uses in 
transportation, would 
you: 
















Table 9: Frequency table for responses on effect of taxes on profitability 
 
What does a per litre increase in taxes on diesel mean for profitability in the trucking 
industry? 
 





Valid Profitability will 
be reduced 
much 
25 32,5 32,5 32,5 
  Benchmark 
response: 
Profitability 
will be reduced 
a little 
31 40,3 40,3 72,7 
  Profitability will 
not change 
11 14,3 14,3 87,0 
  Profitability will 
increase a little 
5 6,5 6,5 93,5 
  Do not know 5 6,5 6,5 100,0 




Table 10: One-Sample Test for responses on effect of taxes on profitability 
 
  








Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
What does a per 
litre increase in 
taxes on diesel 
mean for 
profitability in the 
trucking industry? 














Table 11. Frequency table for responses on effect of taxes on profits over time 
 
How will the effect of a per litre increase in taxes on diesel influence trucking industry 
profits over time? 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Benchmark response: 
Profitability will be 
reduced mostly in the 
first half year 
37 48,1 48,1 48,1 
  Profitability will be 
reduced mostly in the 
long term 
13 16,9 16,9 64,9 
  Profitability will have 
the same effect in the 
short and long run 
16 20,8 20,8 85,7 
  Do not know 11 14,3 14,3 100,0 













Table 12. One-Sample T-Test for response on effect of taxes on profits over time 
 
  








Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
How will the effect of 
a per litre increase in 
taxes on diesel 
influence trucking 
industry profits over 
time? 






Table 13. One-Sample Test for misperception of costs involved in subsidizing fuel in oil 
producing countries hypothesis 
 
In nations that produce and export oil, do you agree that oil consumers should pay fuel taxes? 
 
  








Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
In nations that 
produce and export 
oil, do you agree that 
oil consumers should 
pay fuel taxes? 






Table 14. One-Sample Test for decision on tax level in Moxnes (2010)  
 
 








Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Avgifter kan benyttes 
til å redusere utslipp 
av klimagasser. Om 
du fikk bestemme 


















Table 15. One-Sample Test for responses on size of the effect of taxes on profitability in the trucking industry 
 
  








Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Hva betyr en 
økning på 2 










Table 16. One-Sample Test for responses on timing of the effect of taxes on profitability in the trucking industry 
 
  








Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Hvordan vil effekten 
av en økning på 2 
kroner per liter i 
avgiftene på diesel 
fordele seg over tid? 





Table 17. Frequency table for responses on effect of an increase in fuel taxes on their 
personal economy. 
 
If all fuel prices increase by 20 % due to new fuel taxes, how do you think this will influence 
your personal economy? 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Strongly negative effect 39 50,6 50,6 50,6 
Slightly negative effect 26 33,8 33,8 84,4 
No effect 8 10,4 10,4 94,8 
Slightly positive effect 4 5,2 5,2 100,0 
Total 77 100,0 100,0   
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Appendix c: Chi-Square Tests 
 
Table 18. Frequencies for responses on Question 1: Diesel taxes can be used to reduce emissions of greenhouse 







Reduce diesel tax 
level 
15 31,8 -16,8 
Keep the current 
diesel tax level 
22 27,0 -5,0 
Increase diesel tax 
level 
37 8,9 28,1 
Do not know 3 9,4 -6,4 
Total 77     
 
NPAR TEST 
  /CHISQUARE=Diesel_tax 
  /EXPECTED=0.41 0.348 0.115 0.121 





Table 19. Chi-Square Test to compare the results of the survey on the decision of tax level in the 









gases. If you 
were to 
decide the 
level of the 
diesel tax for 















Table 20. Frequencies for question 2: What does a per litre increase in taxes on diesel mean for profitability in 










25 50,1 -25,1 
Profitability will 
be reduced a 
little 
31 11,2 19,8 
Profitability will 
not change 
11 2,8 8,2 
Profitability will 
increase a little 
5 3,2 1,8 
Do not know 5 9,7 -4,7 







  /CHISQUARE=Trucking_profitability 
  /EXPECTED=0.65 0.146 0.037 0.041 0.126 
  /MISSING ANALYSIS. 
 
Table 21. Chi-Square Test to compare the results of the survey on the perceived size of the effect of 
diesel taxes in the survey to preliminary work undertaken by Moxnes (2010) 
 
  

















a  2 cells (40,0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell 






Table 22. Frequencies for question 3: How will the effect of a per litre increase in taxes on diesel influence 







Profitability will be 
reduced mostly in 
the first half year 
37 25,3 11,7 
Profitability will be 
reduced mostly in 
the long term 
13 12,6 ,4 
Profitability will 
have the same 
effect in the short 
and long run 
16 22,9 -6,9 
Do not know 11 16,2 -5,2 
Total 77     
 
NPAR TEST 
  /CHISQUARE=Profits_overtime 
  /EXPECTED=0.329 0.163 0.297 0.211 






Table 23. Chi-Square Test to compare the results of the survey on the timing of the effect of the tax in 
the survey to preliminary work undertaken by Moxnes (2010) 
 
  
How will the 























Appendix d: Independent Sample Tests 
 
Table 24. Independent sample test for significant difference in the mean decisions on tax levels 
across nationality  
 





Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F 
Sig




























you were to 
decide the 
level of the 
diesel tax 
















































Table 25. Independent sample test for significant difference in the mean decisions on tax levels 
across age group 26-35 years and 36-45 years. 
 





Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F 
Sig




























you were to 
decide the 
level of the 
diesel tax 















































Table 26. Independent sample test for significant difference in the mean decisions on tax 
levels across age group 36-45 years and 46 years or older. 
 






s t-test for Equality of Means 
F 
Sig


























gases. If you 
were to 
decide the 
level of the 
diesel tax 

























































Table 27. Independent Sample T-test for significant difference in the mean trust of 
government use of incomes from fuel tax beneficially, across nationalities? 
 






s t-test for Equality of Means 
F 
Sig















































































Appendix e: Paired-Sample Tests 
 
Table 28. Paired Samples Correlations comparing diesel tax level decisions in Q.1 to Q.13.  
 





Diesel taxes can be 
used to reduce 
emissions of 
greenhouse gases. If 
you were to decide the 
level of the diesel tax 
for all uses in 
transportation, would 
you: & Diesel taxes 
can be used to reduce 
emissions of 
greenhouse gases. If 
you were to decide the 
level of the diesel tax 
for transportation 
purposes would you: 































n Upper Lower 
Pair 
1 
Diesel taxes can be 
used to reduce 
emissions of 
greenhouse gases. If 
you were to decide the 
level of the diesel tax 
for all uses in 
transportation, would 
you: - Diesel taxes can 
be used to reduce 
emissions of 
greenhouse gases. If 
you were to decide the 





level of the diesel tax 
for transportation 
purposes would you: 
Appendix f: Multiple response tables 
 
 




What does a per litre increase in taxes on diesel mean for 
profitability in the trucking industry? 
Profitabilit
















Diesel taxes can be 
used to reduce 
emissions of 
greenhouse gases. If 
you were to decide 
the level of the 







Count 7 3 2 2 1 
Row % 46,7% 20,0% 13,3% 13,3% 6,7% 
Col % 28,0% 9,7% 18,2% 40,0% 20,0% 
Table 
% 





Count 7 10 3 1 1 
Row % 31,8% 45,5% 13,6% 4,5% 4,5% 
Col % 28,0% 32,3% 27,3% 20,0% 20,0% 
Table 
% 




Count 11 16 6 2 2 
Row % 29,7% 43,2% 16,2% 5,4% 5,4% 
Col % 44,0% 51,6% 54,5% 40,0% 40,0% 
Table 
% 
14,3% 20,8% 7,8% 2,6% 2,6% 
Do not know Count   2     1 
Row %   66,7%     33,3% 
Col %   6,5%     20,0% 
Table 
% 




















Table 31. Multiple Response Tables for decision on taxes and perceived effect on 
profitability over time 
 
 
Diesel taxes can be used to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases. If you were to decide the level of 














How will the 











be reduced mostly 
in the first half 
year 
Count 4 12 20 1 37 
Row % 10,8 32,4 54,1 2,7 100,0 
Column 
% 
26,7 54,5 54,1 33,3 48,1 
Table % 5,2 15,6 26,0 1,3 48,1 
Profitability will 
be reduced mostly 
in the long term 
Count 4 2 6 1 13 
Row % 30,8 15,4 46,2 7,7 100,0 
Column 
% 
26,7 9,1 16,2 33,3 16,9 
Table % 5,2 2,6 7,8 1,3 16,9 
Profitability will 
have the same 
effect in the short 
and long run 
Count 5 7 4   16 
Row % 31,3 43,8 25,0   100,0 
Column 
% 
33,3 31,8 10,8   20,8 
Table % 6,5 9,1 5,2   20,8 
Do not know Count 2 1 7 1 11 
Row % 18,2 9,1 63,6 9,1 100,0 
Column 
% 
13,3 4,5 18,9 33,3 14,3 
Table % 2,6 1,3 9,1 1,3 14,3 
Total Count 15 22 37 3 77 
Row % 19,5 28,6 48,1 3,9 100,0 
Column % 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 























What does a per litre increase in taxes on diesel mean for 








































Count 11 19 5 1 1 37 
Row % 29.7 51.4 13.5 2.7 2.7 100.0 
Column 
% 
44.0 61.3 45.5 20.0 20.0 48.1 
Table 
% 







Count 6 3 2 2   13 
Row % 46.2 23.1 15.4 15.4   100.0 
Column 
% 
24.0 9.7 18.2 40.0   16.9 
Table 
% 




effect in the 
short and 
long run 
Count 5 7 2 1 1 16 
Row % 31.3 43.8 12.5 6.3 6.3 100.0 
Column 
% 
20.0 22.6 18.2 20.0 20.0 20.8 
Table 
% 
6.5 9.1 2.6 1.3 1.3 20.8 
Do not 
know 
Count 3 2 2 1 3 11 
Row % 27.3 18.2 18.2 9.1 27.3 100.0 
Column 
% 
12.0 6.5 18.2 20.0 60.0 14.3 
Table 
% 
3.9 2.6 2.6 1.3 3.9 14.3 
Total Count 25 31 11 5 5 77 
Row % 32.5 40.3 14.3 6.5 6.5 100.0 
Column % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table % 32.5 40.3 14.3 6.5 6.5 100.0 
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Appendix g: Correlation Results  
 
Table 33. Pearson Correlation for the relationship between the chosen options for decision on 
diesel taxes and which income group would benefit the most from government spending of 
tax incomes  
 
    
Diesel taxes can 




gases. If you 
were to decide 
the level of the 





group do you 
think would 
benefit the most 
from 
government 
spending of tax 
incomes? 
Diesel taxes can be used to 
reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases. If you 
were to decide the level of 
the diesel tax for all uses in 




  ,750 
N 
68 68 
Which income group do you 
think would benefit the 
most from government 
spending of tax incomes? 
Pearson Correlation -,039 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 






















Table 34. Spearman‘s Rank Order Correlation for the relationship between the chosen options 
for decision on diesel taxes and which income group would benefit the most from government 
spending of tax incomes  
 
      
Diesel taxes 




gases. If you 
were to 
decide the 
level of the 
diesel tax for 

















Diesel taxes can be 
used to reduce 
emissions of 
greenhouse gases. If 
you were to decide the 
level of the diesel tax 










Which income group 
do you think would 
benefit the most from 
government spending 









Table 35. Frequency table for responses on effect of an increase in fuel taxes on their 
personal economy. 
 









Valid Strongly negative 
effect 
39 50,6 50,6 50,6 
Slightly negative 
effect 
26 33,8 33,8 84,4 
No effect 8 10,4 10,4 94,8 
Slightly positive 
effect 
4 5,2 5,2 100,0 
Total 77 100,0 100,0   
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Table 36. Spearman‘s Rank order Correlation to test if willingness to increase taxes is higher 
when people trust their government to use proceeds from fuel tax revenues to the benefit of 
most people 
 
      
Diesel taxes 




gases. If you 
were to 
decide the 
level of the 
diesel tax for 
















Diesel taxes can be 
used to reduce 
emissions of 
greenhouse gases. If 
you were to decide the 
level of the diesel tax 










 Do you trust that your 
home government 
would use incomes 
from fuel taxes to the 























      
Diesel taxes 




gases. If you 
were to 
decide the 
level of the 
diesel tax for 
all uses in 
transportation
, would you: 
If all fuel 
prices 
increase by 
20 % due to 
new fuel 
taxes, how do 




Spearman's rho Diesel taxes can be used 
to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases. If 
you were to decide the 
level of the diesel tax 










If all fuel prices 
increase by 20 % due to 
new fuel taxes, how do 
you think this will 




















Appendix h. Fuel Prices (November 2008) for 170 countries (Source GTZ International 





















































































































































































































Appendix j: Tutorials for use of Survey Monkey Software 
Creating a New Survey Form 
Step 1: 
Click the [Create Survey] button located on the top left of all of the pages in your account to 
open the create survey page. 
  
Step 2: 
There are 3 different options you can use to create a new survey. Select one of those options 
to apply to your new survey form. 
1. Create a new survey from scratch – will create a blank survey form that you can use to 
add your own questions 
2. Copy an existing survey – can be used to create a copy of a survey form you have 
already created 
3. Use a Survey Template – will allow you to select from our list of pre-designed survey 




Click the [Add Question Here] button in the location on the page you want your question to 
display. When the Question Editor window opens, select which Question Type you want from 
the drop-down menu at the top of the page. This will display all of the appropriate text fields 
where you can customize the question text, answer choices, etc. to format your question. 
Any time you click the [Save] button it saves your questions and survey design up to that 
point. If you leave your account and login later, your survey is saved under the My Surveys 
section. You can then pick up where you left off. 
  For more information on how to add a question to your survey click here. 
  For more information on what types of questions we offer click here. 
  
Optional Question Formatting 
In addition to being able to customize your question type, text and answer choices, you also 
have options to customize how each question looks and behaves for respondents. You can 
find these options listed in the Edit Question window by using the Scroll bar on the left hand 
side. 
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Click on any of the options below for more details about how each feature works. 
 Sort/Randomize answer choices 
 Add Comment Field 
 Validate Text 
 Require Answer to Question 
 Change Question Size and Placement 
You can use the following editing options within your main Survey Edit page, click on them 
for more details about how each edit option works:  
 Move Question  
 Copy Question  
 Delete Question 
 Restore Question 
  
Add Pages 
When you create a survey, the default Edit Survey page opens to page #1.  Click the [Add 
Page Before/After] button to add a new page to your survey.  In this page you can choose to 
insert a title for your page and include text for an introduction or description of the 
page.  Click the [Split Page Here] button before any question to create a page break in your 
survey and divide the questions onto separate pages. 
  For more information on how to add a page to your survey click here.  
  For more information on how to insert a page break or split a page in your survey click 
here. 
  
A. Edit Pages 
You can use the following editing options within your main Survey Edit page, click on them 
for more details about how each edit option works: 
 Move 
Page                                                                                                                                   
             
 Copy Page  





B. Previewing Pages 
You can look over you survey design in a few different ways to make sure it meets all of your 
specifications.  Click on the options below for more details on how to review your design. 
 Viewing Pages  
 Preview your Survey  
 Print your Survey Design  
  
Customize Your Design 
A. Survey Design Options 
In addition to being able to customize your questions and pages, you also have options to 
customize specific design options for the whole survey. You can find these settings listed in 
the [Survey Options] section of the Design page. 
You can use the following editing options within your main Survey Edit page, click on them 
for more details about how each edit option works: 
 Edit Page and Question Numbering  
 Add a Logo  
 Progress Bar  
 Hide/Display Survey and Page Titles  
 Edit Navigation Links (Prev, Next, Done, Exit Survey)  
 Required Questions  
  
B. Themes 
You can also customize the colors and fonts in your survey to help further brand your survey 
form and associate it with your own business colors and style templates. 
 
We offer a number of pre-created themes to select from (all of which are 508 compliant) or 
you can select a theme and then edit it to customize all of the colors and fonts to meet your 
specifications. 
  For more information on how to insert a page break or split a page in your survey click 
here. 




Creating a Question: 
1. Click the [Add Question Here] button to open the Question Editor. 
2. Choose the question type from the drop-down menu. 
3. Create your question and click [Save Changes].  
* Clicking the [save changes] button automatically updates your survey with the new 
question. 
Example: To create a single menu of drop-down choices, select Multiple Choice (Only One 
Answer) for the question type and choose Drop-down Menu for the display format.  
 Multiple Choice (Only One Answer) 
 Display Choices as a Drop-down Menu 
Optional Formatting 
 Sort/Randomize answer choices  
 Add Comment Field  
 Validate Text  
 Require Answer to Question  
 Change Question Size and Placement 
After creating your question and selecting the desired options for the question, click the [Save 
Changes] button to add the question to your survey.  
NOTE: What do I do if I receive an error when trying to save a question? 
Please scroll through the question settings to see if you have omitted part of the question text 
or error message text. 
  
Editing a Question: 
You may edit questions any time by clicking the [Edit Question] button above the question. 
To Edit a Question after saving it, click the [Edit Question] button from the Design Editor. 
Note: Editing is limited for questions with results. 
 Can I edit the survey after collecting responses? 
 How to add page breaks and modify page description. 
  
Creating a Ranking Question: 
To rank respondent choices, you can use the Rating Scale question-type. 
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NOTE: SurveyMonkey allows up to a 16 point rating scale. 
When creating this question, you assign a "weight" or value to each column choice to produce 
a Rating Average in your results. In addition to the weighted columns, you can select to 
"force" respondents to chose only one selection per column (forced ranking). 
Take a quick survey to see how this question type calculates results. 
Watch the video demo 
  
Example: How to create a Rating Scale. 
Step 1: Select the Rating Scale Question from the question menu. 
 
Step 2: Enter the question text. 
Step 3: Enter each Row Choice on a separate line. 
 
Step 4: Select the number or ratings from the drop-down 
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A. Labels and Weight   
 
Enter the label for the columns in each Label field and assign a "weight" to each label ("1" for 
the lowest ranking and so on.) If you select the N/A column, it will automatically be assigned 
a value of "0" so that it will not affect your results. (This question type allows 16 ratings or 
column choices. It is not possible to add additional column choices to this question type.) 
B. Add N/A column 
 
The N/A or "Other" option is given a value of "0" so that it does not affect the response 
average. It is not calculated in the response average because the system assigns a zero value to 
that column choice and automatically subtracts any responses submitted to the N/A choice 
when calculating the response average. (See example rating average below) 
C. Forced Ranking 
 
If you check 'Allow Only One Response per Column (Forced Ranking)' under the column 
name field, respondents will "be forced" to order the row choices by importance. 
  
Matrix of Choices vs. Rating Questions 
Rating questions allow you to assign weighted values to the column choices. This tabluates a 
Rating Average in the Analyze portion of the survey. Matrix of Choices questions do not have 
this functionality. However, you can apply the forced ranking option to both types. 
To view examples and the data presentation in the Analyze page, please take a look over the 
following survey: 
 Matrix/Rating Survey 
 134 
How to distribute your survey through collectors 
Have you finished your survey design? Now you can decide how you would like to send out 
your survey to collect responses! 
 
Sending your survey via email? Putting a link on your blog? Collecting responses is as simple 
as copying and pasting a link to your survey into an outgoing email message or into a page 
on a website. We even give you the option to stop collection automatically when you reach a 
date or response count that you specify. You can send a survey invitation to your own email 
list using our simple list management tool. Track who responds to your survey, and send 
follow-up reminders to those who don't. We'll even manage opt-outs automatically for you. 
  
Instructional Video About Collectors 
The Collector type you create determines the type of link and how you'll administer or send 
the survey. 
Click to watch the Collector in action! 
  
 
Get started now by reviewing all of the different ways you can send out your survey! 
1. What is a Collector? 
2. Creating a Web Link Collector 
3. Creating an Email Invitation Collector 
4. Creating a Popup Window Collector 
5. Collector Setting Options 
6. Additional Data Collection Options 
 
  
What is a Collector? 
After designing a survey, you are ready to distribute it through a link. A Collector is what 
generates that link to send to an audience. There are three types of collectors we offer, each 
with different properties and setting options. Select one or more of these options to generate a 
link that will give recipients direct access to your survey form: 
  The Web Link: Collect anonymous surveys by posting a link on a website, or email 
it using your own email. 
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  The Email Invitation: Track respondents through "unique" links delivered by our 
mail server. 
  The Popup Window: Have a survey or invitation open when people visit your 
website and collect anonymous responses. 
 For more information on what defines a collector, click here. 
NOTE: As soon as you create your survey link it is active! Simply distribute your survey link 
and any recipient clicking on it will be taken to the first page of your survey! After they 
respond, the response is returned automatically into your SurveyMonkey account. It will be 
available for analysis under the Analyze section of the survey. 
  
 
Creating a Web Link Collector 
The link you can send in your own email or post on your Web Page is called the (Web Link) 
Collector. This collector type generates a single, anonymous survey link that you will be able 
to distribute yourself. 
For more information on how to create a Web Link collector click here. 
  
Creating an Email Invitation Collector 
With the Email Invitation collector, you upload your email addresses into our system and we 
distribute a unique, tracking link to each recipient on your list when you send out your 
customized invitation message.  You will also have other benefits such as tracking who 
responded, sending out reminder messages to those who didn‘t yet respond and being able to 
organize your email list by status. 
For more information on how to create an Email Invitation collector click here. 
  
Creating a Popup Window Collector 
If you want your respondents to access the survey via a Popup window within your website 
then you can use the Popup Window Collector.  You can specify the popup configuration that 
you want and we generate a link that includes all of the back end code to make your popup 
behave according to your settings. All you need to do is copy and paste this into your web 
page code. 
For more information on how to create a Popup Window collector click here. 
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Collector Setting Options 
Once you have created a collector, you can customize how it behaves with a number of setting 
options found in the left tool bar of your Collector Details/Get Survey Link page. 
  
A. Change Settings 
Click the [Change Settings] in the left tool bar to view the list of settings you can customize 
and change how your link and survey access will work for respondents. 
Click on any of the options below for more details about how Collector Settings work. 
 Allow Multiple Responses 
 Allow Responses to be Edited 
 Display a ―Thank You‖ Page 
 Survey Completion 
 Save IP Address/Email Address in Results 
 For more information on the Collector Settings click here. 
  
B. Change Restrictions 
Click the [Change Restrictions] in the left tool bar to view the list of restriction options you 
can customize and change how your link and survey access will work for respondents. 
Click on any of the options below for more details about how Collector Restriction settings 
work. 
 Set a Cutoff Date & Time 
 Set a Max Response Count 
 Enable Password Protection  
 Enable IP Blocking 
 For more information on the Collector Restrictions click here. 
  
Additional Data Collection Options 
In the Collector page there are additional options that you can use to manage access to your 
links or to use to manually enter in responses to the online survey form from another source. 
 Manual Data Entry  
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 Close Collector Now  
  
You can use multiple collectors to reach different audiences with one survey. For extra 
tips about how to use multiple collectors to more effectively manage your data collection 
click here. 
  
How to analyze survey responses 
View your results anytime as they are being collected in real-time. Watch live graphs and 
charts, and then dig down to get individual responses. Securely share your survey results with 
others.  Powerful filtering and cross tabulation allows you to display only the responses you're 
interested in. With one click, you can download a summary of your results in multiple 
formats. If you're a statistics nut, you can download all of the raw data you've collected as a 




Get started now by reviewing all of the different ways you can analyze your survey data!  
1. Viewing Survey Responses 
2. Filter Survey Responses 
3. CrossTab Survey Responses 
4. Download Responses 
5. Share Responses 
 
  
Viewing Survey Responses 
The responses for each page are saved and displayed in the analyze section after respondents 
click the navigation button and successfully advance to the next survey page. 
  
A. Response Summary: 
The Response Summary is the default Analyze page, but can also be accessed by clicking on 
the [View Summary] button in the left tool bar in the Analyze section. This page provides the 
Summary View of your survey results and displays information such as the number of 
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respondents that answered each question, the percentages each answer option received and 
basic graphs among other data. 
NOTE: Open-ended responses will not be visible directly on the Summary page. Please click 
the [show replies] button in the space where the open-ended question would be to see all of 
your respondents‘ comments. 
 
B. Browse Individual Responses: 
  
To view individual responses, click the [Browse Responses] 
button in the left tool bar in the Analyze section. The Browse 
Responses page will open to the most recently submitted 
response and will allow you to page through a full responses 
one by one. You can view collection information about each 
response in the header and can also Edit or Delete individual 
responses here. 
 Click on the options below for more details about how to use the Editing Features in the 
Browse Responses page: 
 Delete Individual Responses  
 Edit Individual Responses  
  
C. Custom Reports: 
Create a Custom Report by selecting the [Add Report] button next to the ‗current report‘ 
drop-down menu at the top of the Response Summary page. 
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Custom Reports give customers an opportunity to create a new report and specify which 
questions or pages they would like to view in the Analyze page. Creating a custom ‗view‘ of 
your survey data allows you to examine a set of correlated questions in one page instead of 
scrolling through the entire report to find and compare these questions. 
 You can also hide sensitive data/questions from being viewed in a Shared Report. 
Click here to learn more. 
 For more information on how to use a custom report click here. 
 
  
Filter Survey Responses 
 
Create and manage filters for your data by clicking on the 
[Filter Responses] button in the left tool bar of the Analyze 
section. 
Filtering allows you to organize and view subsets of data for 
advanced analysis.  Filtered data will display only the set of full 
responses that match your filter criteria, allowing you to find 
patterns in your data more easily. 
 For more information on what a Filter is click here. 
Types of Filters Offered: 
There are three types of filters we offer. Select one or more of these options in the Filter 
Response page to specify the criteria you wish to view in your survey results. 
1. Filter by Response:  Based on questions in the survey, you can pick specific answer 
choices to build a response-based filter. You can add multiple filters and combine 
them with a logical expression. 
2. Filter by Properties: Based on specific properties recorded on the back-end by our 
system.  These include Response Dates, Response Status, Email Address, First Name, 
Last Name, Custom Value, and IP Address. 
3. Filter by Collector:  Only active if you have multiple collectors created for the survey. 






CrossTab Survey Responses 
 
Create and manage crosstabs for your data by clicking on the 
[Crosstab Responses] button in the left tool bar of the Analyze 
section. 
 
Cross-tabulated data is useful for showing a side by side 
comparison of how respondents answered a particular question 
compared to the remaining questions they answered and 
determine how they are interrelated.  The result is a table of the 
results, each column representing the group of respondents who 
selected a particular answer choice for the comparison question 
you selected. 
 





You can download the responses you've collected at any time 
(yes, even while you are still receiving responses) with a 
Professional subscription. We simply take a snapshot of your 
current responses, without disrupting your survey.  
We offer download reports in PDF, HTML, CSV and Excel 
formats. 
  
A. Downloading Individual Questions: 
If you need to export one specific question rather than the entire survey, you have the ability 
to single it out and download only that question‘s results. This option is handy if you need to 
export open ended comments into a PDF format. 
You can download an individual question by clicking on the ‗Download‘ link in the top right 
corner of your question on the Response Summary page. 
 
 For more information on how to download results to an individual question click here. 
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B. Charting Individual Questions: 
You are able to export a visual graph/chart that represents the data of an individual question 
directly from the Analyze, Response Summary page.  This feature is available for most 
question types and will present your graph/chart in a PNG file type that you can save on your 
computer. 
You can chart an individual question by clicking on the ‗Create Chart‘ link in the top right 
corner of your question on the Response Summary page. 
 For more information on how to chart the results to an individual question click here. 
  
C. Summary Download: 
Summary Downloads can be accessed by clicking the [Download Responses] button in the 
Analyze section.  This type of download will display the summarized version of all the 
responses you have collected.  This will appear similar to the data you see in the View 
Summary page in the account.  Each summary download format will display the same data set 
in a slightly different way.  
 
 For more information on how to create Summary Download click here. 
  
D. All Responses Collected: 
The All Responses Collected download can be accessed by clicking the [Download 
Responses] button in the Analyze section.  This type of download includes all of the full 
individual survey responses listed out in a single Excel Spreadsheet. Every row in the 
spreadsheet contains the full set of survey answers for one respondent. 










Sharing Responses enables you to provide direct access to a 
specific set of survey results without giving access to your 
account. With this feature, you can control how much detail to 
share by choosing between a variety of access level settings. 
Create a share link by clicking on the [Share Responses] button 
in the left tool bar in the Analyze section. 
 For more information on how to set up the Share Link click here. 
How to open your exports 
We offer six different export formats to Professional subscribers. All data is delivered to your 
computer in a compressed or zipped format. You will need decompression software installed 
on your browser to open these files. 
  
 
To get started in opening your exports, review the following sections: 
1. Excel Formats 
2. HTML Formats  
3. Viewing Comments, Times, or Dates in Export  
 
  
Excel Formats:  
Step 1: 
Open the Download History page for the results by clicking the [View Download History] 





Click the [Download] button for the requested Export from the Export History page to open 
the compressed file with your decompression software. 
 





Double click or select the Excel file to open the exports formatted for Excel. 
 
 (Select CSV file if using Unicode Characters or 
time and date questions types in survey.) 
  
Step 4: 






Click [Download] from the Download History Page for the export. 
  
Step 2:  





Click [Next] to open the compressed files with the Extraction Wizard. 
 
  








Select the HTML file titled SurveySummary to open the Results Summary of your export. 
You can then click the [View] button to see the open ended questions if you have selected to 
export them with your summary results. 
 
The best way to open the survey to display open-ended responses, time and date formatting 
correctly is to use the .CSV format.  
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Viewing Comments, Times, or Dates in Export 
How to open CSV file in excel 
 
When using the Excel exports, you must format the columns to display the data correctly for 
time and date question types. Please format the start and end date to see the minutes and 
seconds in results. To do so, select the column and format cells. 
 
Viewing Minutes and Seconds with Start and End Dates:  
To view the time with the start and end date, right click the column and select Format Cells; 
then select the "Date" Category. From the type selection, select the type that includes the time 
and click OK. The column will then be formatted to include the time the survey had been 
taken. To view the seconds, select Time from the Category menu when formatting the cells. 
NOTE: Start and End Dates Don't Match!  
We store all start and stop dates and times in UTC (Universal Coordinated Time) (aka GMT) 
within the database. So, all results export in UTC which may be different than the dates and 
times you see when browsing responses in your account. The start date and time when 
browsing responses displays the local time you have set for your account, but the data exports 
in UTC. 
For more information and to register please visit the website: 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/ 
